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I. INTRODUCTION
In the decades following the Civil War, the American legal profession
engaged in a heated debate about the wisdom of replacing the substantive
common law with a written civil code. During the dispute's most intense
period, in the 1880s, discussions of the benefits and shortcomings of codi-
fication appeared regularly in legal publications, as well as in general-
interest newspapers and magazines. Professional organizations and state
legislatures devoted countless hours to the question. Ultimately, the post-
bellum codification movement achieved little. By the 1890s, it was appar-
ent that the American defenders of the common law had won the battle.
The codification impulse lasted into the twentieth century, as reflected in
the Uniform Code and Restatement projects. But there were no further
major campaigns to abandon the common law wholesale in favor of a
code.1
The late nineteenth-century codification debate generated a profusion of
jurisprudential literature. Although modem scholars have not totally ig-
nored this rich body of writing,2 they have devoted surprisingly little at-
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1. See infra Section II.A. (discussing the history of the codification movement).
2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 403-07 (2d ed. 1985);
Lewis Grossman, Codification and the California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 617 (1995) [hereinafter
Grossman, California Mentality]; Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and the Right Answers, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 355 (1999); Mathias Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification: Savigny,
1
Grossman: Langdell Upside-Down
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
tention to it. Strikingly, only a few articles have analyzed the portrait of
the common law painted by Gilded Age jurists who fought codification. 3
This neglect is surprising, for the common law jurisprudence of that period
has engaged the attention of legal scholars for more than a century. The
writings of those who resisted the common law's elimination are an obvi-
ous source of insight into the era's conception of the common law.
Importantly, much anticodification literature described the common law
in a manner greatly different from what standard twentieth-century depic-
tions of Gilded Age private law jurisprudence would lead one to expect.
Legal scholars have long viewed Christopher Columbus Langdell, the
Dean of Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895, as the prototypical
American jurist of the late nineteenth century.4 He portrayed the common
law as a conceptually-ordered scientific system in which rigorous logical
reasoning trumped concerns about the just resolution of particular cases.
In Langdell's Orthodoxy, probably the most influential modem article on
Langdell, Thomas Grey dubbed this system of legal thought "classical or-
thodoxy."5 Others have labeled it "mechanical jurisprudence,"6 "classical
legal thought,"7 "liberal legal science, '8 or "Langdellian formalism." 9
Whatever term they have preferred, scholars have long agreed that Gilded
Age legal thinkers viewed the common law as a rigidly logical, amoral
system.
In recent years, some have begun to challenge the notion that soulless
formalism typified Gilded Age common law jurisprudence.'" Stephen
Carter, and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J. COMp. L. 95 (1989). On the American
codification movement preceding the Civil War, see CHARLES M. COOK, AMERICAN CODIFICATION
MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981) and PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE
MIND IN AMERICA 239-65 (1965).
3. Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 LAW & HIST.
REV. 577, 602-11 (2002) [hereinafter Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence]; Reimann, supra note 2;
Morriss, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977) ("Langdell ... has long
been taken as a symbol of the new age [from the Civil War to World War II].").
5. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). A search of the LEXIS
"Law Reviews and Journals" database resulted in 306 articles citing to this article (LEXIS search con-
ducted May 3, 2007).
6. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
7. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9-31 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3
(1980).
8. Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise,
1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70, 88-89 (Gerald L. Ger-
son ed., 1983).
9. At least 94 law review articles have used this phrase. (LEXIS search conducted May 3, 2007).
10. See, e.g., Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra note 3; Bruce Kimball, Langdell on
Contracts and Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 345
(2007); William P. LaPiana, Jurisprudence of History and Truth, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 519 (1992);
Stephen A. Siegel, Francis Wharton s Orthodoxy: God, Historical Jurisprudence, and Classical Legal
Thought, 46 J. LEGAL HIST. 422 (2004); Stephen A. Siegel, Joel Bishop's Orthodoxy, 13 LAW & HIST.
REV. 215 (1995) [hereinafter Siegel, Joel Bishop's Orthodoxy]; Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman
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Siegel, for example, has successfully demonstrated that Langdell's sup-
posed amorality was not characteristic of late nineteenth-century legal
thought. He has closely analyzed the work of other leading jurists of the
era, both religious scholars such as Joel Bishop and Francis Wharton and
secular scholars such as John Chipman Gray, and has shown that they be-
lieved the common law had a moral basis."1 Nevertheless, Siegel retains
the label "classical" in describing these men because, like Langdell, they
firmly embraced the common law's formal conceptual order. Indeed,
Siegel's central thesis is that moral classicism was the standard jurispru-
dential approach of the late nineteenth century.' 2 Strikingly, one scholar
has recently contended that even Langdell himself was not "Langdellian,"
as that term has long been understood.' 3 Bruce Kimball challenges the
familiar portrait of Langdell as an amoral logician. Instead, he depicts
Langdell as a flexible thinker concerned with justice and policy. Kimball
does not, however, deny that Langdell was a classicist, but only that he
was an amoral one. 14
The anticodification literature explored in this Article powerfully sup-
ports the rising consensus among revisionist legal historians that Gilded
Age jurists generally viewed morality as an essential component of the
common law. Indeed, the anticodifiers argued that the common law's
ethical content was one of its main advantages over a code system. This
Article goes further than the current revisionist scholarship, however, by
suggesting that at least some late-nineteenth century jurists so devalued
formal conceptual order, at least when it came into conflict with case-
specific justice, that they can hardly be characterized as "classical" at all.
The anticodifiers, most notably James Coolidge Carter, their leading intel-
lectual voice, explicitly minimized the role of formality and conceptual
order in common law decision making. This Article will explore how the
battle against codification drove Carter and others to formulate a common
law method that largely rejected the formal and conceptual aspects of legal
reasoning that dominated Langdell's system. 5 Indeed, in trumpeting the
advantages of the common law, Carter, an almost exact contemporary of
Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1513 (2001) [hereinafter
Siegel, John Chipman Gray].
11. Siegel, Francis Wharton's Orthodoxy, supra note 10; Siegel, Joel Bishop's Orthodoxy, supra
note 10; Siegel, John Chipman Gray, supra note 10.
12. Siegel, John Chipman Gray, supra note 10, at 1515-16.
13. Kimball, supra note 10; Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century
of Historiography, 1906-2000s, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 277 (2004) [hereinafter Kimball, The Langdell
Problem]; Bruce A. Kimball, "Warn Students that I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They Are
Not To Take as Law ": The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classroom of Early C. C. Lang-
dell, 1870-1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57 (1999).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 80-85.
15. Andrew Morriss, interestingly, reads Carter and reaches the opposite conclusion. Morriss,
supra note 2, at 389 (describing the anticodifiers as having "a shared sense of the common law as a
system of rules that, at least, is striving toward internal consistency ....").
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Langdell,16 manifested a rule skepticism that foreshadowed that of the le-
gal realists a half century later.
Can a legal system be both classical and moral? Siegel argues not only
that such a combination is possible, but that it epitomized Gilded Age ju-
risprudence. 7 He fails, however, to acknowledge that there is, at bottom,
an unavoidable tension between classicism and justice, between formal
conceptual order and equity. Morality undoubtedly shaped the classical
legal system's general principles, and it may have helped guide the reason-
ing process by which legal scientists derived lower-level rules from these
general principles. Nevertheless, a jurist applying lower-level rules to ac-
tual affairs simply has to choose occasionally between the deductive ap-
plication of a rule and the equitable resolution of a particular case. Carter
and Langdell both recognized this phenomenon, but they diverged on the
appropriate solution. When forced to choose between formal deductive
reasoning and a fair outcome, Langdell favored the former whereas Carter
opted for the latter.
II. THE BATTLE OVER THE CIVIL CODE: FIELD VERSUS CARTER
A. The Codification Movement
Attorney David Dudley Field made his first major foray into the world
of codification in 1847, when he assumed membership on a New York
State commission created, pursuant to the state's 1846 constitution, "to re-
vise, reform, simplify, and abridge the rules and practice, pleadings, forms
and proceedings of the courts of record of this State."' 8 This three-man
commission produced a Code of Civil Procedure, which New York en-
acted in 1848.19 Field so dominated the drafting of this instrument that it
became commonly known as "the Field Code."2 ° It abolished the complex
scheme of common law writ pleading, as well as the independent system
of equity procedure, and replaced both with a simplified, uniform proce-
dural system.2 The procedural code was Field's most successful codifica-
16. Langdell lived from 1826 to 1906. Carter lived from 1827 to 1905.
17. Siegel, Francis Wharton's Orthodoxy, supra note 10, at 442.
18. N.Y. CONST. OF 1846, art. VI, § 24, quoted in FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 391 (describing the
formation of the commission and Field's participation on it).
19. In 1849, this commission also completed a Code of Criminal Procedure, which New York
finally enacted in 1881.
20. Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Ear-
lier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 317 (1988).
21. At least on the surface, code procedure, with its single form of action, fact pleading, joinder,
and discovery, borrowed more from equity than from the common law. Id. at 337. Subrin, however,
contends that despite the indisputable commonalities between the Field Code and equity practice,
"Field... leaned as much, or more, toward the view of common law procedure, as to equity."
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 939 (1987). According to Subrin, Field rejected the
[19:149
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tion effort; the majority of states ultimately embraced the Field Code or
some revised version of it.22 Moreover, the code eventually served, in
some important ways, as a model for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
enacted in 1938.23
Even after 1848, however, the substantive private law of New York-its
law of torts, contracts, property, domestic relations, wills, and agency, for
example-remained mostly uncodified. Lawyers and judges had to ex-
tract these rules from countless reported judicial decisions and some
poorly organized statutes. New York was hardly alone in this respect; de-
spite the efforts of many fervent and eloquent codification proponents in
antebellum America,24 substantive private law development was still
court-centered throughout the country at the time of the Civil War. In
other words, the United States remained, from a substantive rather than a
procedural perspective, almost uniformly a common law country.25
In addition to mandating procedural reform, New York's 1846 constitu-
tion had also required the establishment of a commission "to reduce into a
written and systematic code the whole body of the law of this state, or so
much and such parts thereof as to the said commissioners shall seem prac-
ticable and expedient., 26 The first such commission failed to produce a
code, but in 1857 the legislature established a new code commission and
named David Dudley Field one of its three members. Field was primarily
responsible for writing the resulting substantive Civil Code.2 7
The commission presented the final draft of the Civil Code to the legis-
lature in 1865. In the introduction to the code, Field described it as a
"complete digest of our existing law, common and statute, dissected and
analyzed, avoiding repetitions and rejecting contradictions, moulded into
distinct propositions, and arranged in scientific order, with proper amend-
ments, and in this form sanctioned by the Legislature . "..."28 Field also
explained what benefits codification offered:
flexibility and judicial discretion of equity because he wanted the legal system to be efficient and pre-
dictable. He thus designed a procedure that was, despite its surface similarities to equity procedure,
more confining and formalistic. Id. at 934-36; Subrin, supra note 20, at 327-34.
22. Charles E. Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY
ESSAYS CELEBRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL REFORM 55 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949).
23. See id. at 64 ("[T]here can be no question but that [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] rep-
resent a present-day interpretation and execution of what are at bottom the Field principles.").
24. See generally COOK, supra note 2.
25. Louisiana was the major exception. Essentially a civil law state, it enacted, in 1825, a general,
substantive Civil Code, drafted by Edward Livingston. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 173-74, 403. In
1860, Georgia became the first common law state to enact a civil code. Id. at 405-06; Gunther A.
Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435, 511-12
(2000).
26. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. 1, § 17, quoted in Morriss, supra note 2, at 389.
27. Daun van Ec, David Dudley Field and the Reconstruction of the Law 49 (1974) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University) (on file with author).
28. Introduction, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, at xv (Albany, Weed, Parsons
1865) [hereinafter Introduction, CIVIL CODE].
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In the first place, it will enable the lawyer to dispense with a great
number of books which now incumber [sic] the shelves of his library.
In the next place, it will thus save a vast amount of labor, now forced
upon lawyers and judges, in searching through the reports, examining
and collecting cases, and drawing inferences from decisions .... In
the third place, it will afford an opportunity for settling, by legislative
enactment, many disputed questions, which the courts have never
been able to settle. In the fourth place, it will enable the Legislature
to effect reforms in different branches of the law, which can only be
effected by simultaneous and comprehensive legislation .... In the
fifth place, a publication of a Code will diffuse among the people a
more general and accurate knowledge of their rights and duties, than
can be obtained in any other manner.29
Despite Field's references to the Civil Code's substantive reforms and
its resolution of disputed questions, his primary goal in drafting the code
was not to revolutionize the content of New York's law, but rather to em-
body existing law in an organized statutory form.3" In his view, the only
reforms in the code specifically worth mentioning concerned the rights of
married women, the adoption of children, and the assimilation of the law
of real property and personal property.31 By Field's own count, there were
only about 120 other changes, all "of less importance," in the code's 1,998
sections. "
Field spent many years doggedly urging the adoption of his Civil Code.
Both the Assembly and the Senate of New York voted to enact the Civil
Code in 1879 and 1882, but each time the governor vetoed it. Undaunted,
Field lobbied for the passage of the Civil Code annually throughout the
1880s. 33 Nonetheless, it never became part of New York law. Field's
successes in the area of substantive codification were confined to a few
western states.34 His greatest triumph occurred in 1872, when California
adopted a modified version of his Civil Code.35 As will be discussed be-
29. Id. at xxix-xxx.
30. See COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, FINAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF NEW YORK, at vi
(1865) ("In all this immense range of subjects,.., it has been the general purpose of the Commission-
ers to give the law as it now exists .....
31. Id. at xxx.
32. Id.
33. Alison Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY
ESSAYS CELEBRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL REFORM 36-42 (Alison Reppy ed., 1949);
van Ee, supra note 27, at 331-32. The code commission established in 1857 drafted not only the sub-
stantive Civil Code, but also a Political Code (1860) and a Penal Code (1865). The New York legisla-
ture never enacted the former, but it enacted the latter in 1881.
34. The Dakota Territory enacted Field's Civil Code with almost no changes in 1865, and both
North and South Dakota continued to use it when they became states in 1889. Weiss, supra note 25, at
512. Montana enacted a revised version of the code in 1895. Id. at 513. California's adoption of
Field's Civil Code is discussed infra.
35. See generally Grossman, California Mentality, supra note 2. In California, the Civil Code as
first enacted was identical to Field's New York draft, except for some revisions to accommodate ear-
lier California legislation. In 1874, however, the California code was extensively amended to resolve
[19:149
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low, however, the state's judiciary soon minimized the significance of this
event by embracing a method of code interpretation that rendered Califor-
nia's approach to legal decision making little different from that of the tra-
ditional common law states. 6
B. The Anticodification Response
Field's codification campaign failed in New York State largely because
of the energy, passion, and talent of the opponents of codification there.
The leader of this opposition was James Coolidge Carter, an extremely
prominent legal figure in the late nineteenth-century-perhaps the most
famous lawyer of his era. 37  As I have discussed elsewhere, Carter was
one of the nation's leading appellate advocates, and he argued some of the
most important Supreme Court cases of the Gilded Age.38 President
Grover Cleveland likely would have appointed him Chief Justice of the
United States if not for concerns about his health.39 Carter was also an in-
fluential figure in New York City politics and one of the country's fore-
most municipal reformers.4 ° In addition, he served as president of the
American Bar Association and the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (ABCNY).
From within the latter of these organizations, Carter led the successful
fight against Field's efforts to replace New York State's decisional private
law with a civil code. Under Carter's direction, ABCNY attorneys issued
a series of pamphlets excoriating the code for failing to reflect the actual
state of the common law in particular substantive areas, even when it was
intended to do so. In some instances, these pamphlets suggested that Field
the many additional conflicts between the code and prior statutes and decisions that had become ap-
parent during the code's first two years of operation. Maurice E. Harrison, The First Half-Century of
the California Civil Code, 10 CAL. L. REv. 185, 187-88 (1922). California and Montana, in addition
to adopting Field's Civil Code, also enacted versions of three other codes Field drafted for New York:
the Code of Civil Procedure, the Political Code, and the Penal code. See Grossman, California Men-
tality, supra note 2, at 617; Weiss, supra note 25, at 512-13.
36. Infra Section V.B.3.
37. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIA-
TION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 173 (1970); JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS, AMERICAN BAR
LEADERS: BIOGRAPHIES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1878-1928, at 80-
85 (1932). For detailed discussions of Carter's career, see Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra
note 3, and Lewis A. Grossman, The Ideal and the Actual of James Coolidge Carter: Morality and Law
in the Gilded Age 389-97 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with au-
thor).
38. Among the prominent cases Carter argued were The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
(1889), Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1897),
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1896), and Hyde v. Continental Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 654 (1895) (companion case to Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
(1895)).
39. See MARTIN, supra note 37, at 173; THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER'S
LIFETIME 281 (1914); Unattributed speech: "James Coolidge Carter" (n.d.) (transcript available in the
Irving Club Collection, Special Collections, Hoskins Library, Univ. of Tenn. Knoxville); see also The
Man for Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1888, at 4.
40. Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 579-80.
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had manipulated the law to favor his plutocratic clients.4" Carter assigned
himself (and Albert Mathews, whose work is also discussed below42) the
task of framing the broader jurisprudential and practical arguments against
codification and in favor of the common law. He did so in two major
pamphlets, titled The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law and The
Provinces of the Written and the Unwritten Law, and in testimony before
the New York Senate.43 During the 1880s, Carter's name became almost
synonymous with the anticodification position.
III. CARTER'S CUSTOM-BASED JURISPRUDENCE
Carter set forth a detailed portrait of the common law in his anticode
pamphlets, as well as in a renowned 1890 presidential address to the
American Bar Association called The Ideal and the Actual in the Law and
a posthumously published book titled Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Func-
tion.4 4 Through these writings, he became the most prominent representa-
tive of the American school of historical jurisprudence. Like Friedrich
Karl von Savigny, the leader of the German historical school, Carter
equated the unwritten law with the evolving customs of the people.45 He
argued that common law judges, instead of making law, found the basis
for their decisions in "the social standard of justice, or from the habits and
customs from which that standard itself has been derived."46 Statutory en-
actments, by contrast, often conflicted with custom, or came to do so as
custom changed while the written law remained static. In Carter's view,
legislation contrary to custom was not only futile, but promoted grave
mischief as the people strove to evade its enforcement. He thus contended
that the regulation of private affairs should remain primarily the province
of the unwritten law.47
By equating the common law with custom, Carter acknowledged that
the law would change along with the habits and manners of the people.
Nonetheless, Carter clung to a form of moral objectivism even while rec-
ognizing social flux. His simultaneous embrace of natural law notions and
41. Id. at 588-89.
42. See infra Section VII.A.
43. JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW (New York, Eve-
ning Post Job Printing Office 1884) [hereinafter CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION]; JAMES C.
CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF THE WRITTEN AND THE UNWRITTEN LAW (New York, Banks & Bros.
1889) [hereinafter CARTER, PROVINCES]; JAMES C. CARTER, ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER IN
OPPOSITION TO THE BILL TO ESTABLISH A CIVIL CODE BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
(n.p. 1887) [hereinafter CARTER, ARGUMENT].
44. James C. Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, in REP. THIRTEENTH ANN. MEETING
A.B.A. 225 (1890) [hereinafter Carter, Ideal and Actual]; JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS
ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND FUNCTION (1907) [hereinafter CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION].
45. See generally Reimann, supra note 2.
46. Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 44, at 228.
47. Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 602-19.
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historical evolutionism represented a coherent, if not always clearly ex-
pressed, melding of the two approaches. 48 Carter believed that the evolu-
tion of custom was characterized by the gradual unfolding of eternal moral
principles. Therefore, the common law, by reflecting customary standards
of justice, embodied elements of natural law. As Carter explained, "[The
law] possesses as an essential feature a moral character; ... it springs
from and reposes upon that everlasting and infinite Justice which is one of
the attributes of Divinity; and ... it is so much of that attribute as each
particular society is able to comprehend and willing to apply to human af-
fairs.,, 49 Because Anglo-American civilization was highly advanced, its
customs, and hence its law, were approaching the ideal.50 Carter asserted,
"I have sought to discover those rules only which actually regulate con-
duct, not those which ought to regulate it."51 Tellingly, however, he then
remarked, "I imagine that the rule which will be found in fact to exist, is
the best."52
Carter's reference to "finding" a legal rule points to another essential
aspect of his jurisprudence. He steadfastly denied that judges "made" law.
Rather, they "declared" already existing law, which they "found" among
the "habits, customs, business and manners of the people, and those previ-
ously declared rules which have sprung out of previous similar inquiries
into habits, customs, business and manners."53 This assertion was a criti-
cal feature of Carter's defense of the common law against the codifiers'
attacks. Advocates of codification often protested that judges did not
"find" the unwritten law, but rather "made" it themselves. Field, for ex-
ample, argued: "[T]he legislative and judicial departments should be kept
distinct.... [W]e violate [this maxim] every hour that we allow judges to
participate in the making of the laws."54 In response, Carter maintained
that custom was an objective, nondiscretionary basis for judicial decisions.
Proponents of codification also frequently condemned the common
law's ex post facto quality. Because the common law was inaccessible to
nonlawyers, they argued, citizens were not aware of their legal obligations
until a judge issued his decision. A code, by contrast, would allow any
person to determine his duties and responsibilities before taking action.
48. Id. at 606-09.
49. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 13.
50. Stephen Siegel has identified a parallel impulse among other legal thinkers of the time.
Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIs. L. REV.
1431, 1438.
51. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 145.
52. Id.
53. Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 44, at 224. He often asserted that judges were society's
"experts" at ascertaining these customs, although he never offered any real support for this assertion.
See, e.g., CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 327; CARTER, PROPOSED
CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 1; CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 11.
54. David Dudley Field, Codification, 20 AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1886).
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David Dudley Field declared, "[T]hat only is truly law which has been
provided beforehand."55 In response, Carter contended that it was fair to
presume that people were familiar with common law rules, because the
common law was based on custom, and "[t]he term [custom] itself imports
that it is known to all."56 He explained: "A man can hardly live in society
without knowing how men act-that is, what custom is.... Custom is of
all things the one most universally known."57
Carter's contention that judges and citizens in a common law system
could determine the single, correct resolution to any legal question de-
pended on the uniformity of custom. If Carter had conceded the existence
of multiple, competing customs, he also would have had to acknowledge
that judges simply selected which custom to follow, and therefore that a
citizen could not know the law before a judge declared it. Carter thus fre-
quently stated that the customs of the people were "universal" and that
there was a uniform "national standard of justice."58  Because judges
themselves were "part of the community," they "knew" and "felt" the
common standard of justice and relied on it when deciding cases.59 The
notion of universal custom also allowed Carter to suggest that the common
law was actually more democratic than legislation, particularly when the
legislature was dominated by corrupt and plutocratic interests.
Customs... being common modes of action, are the unerring evi-
dence of common thought and belief, and as they are the joint prod-
uct of the thoughts of all, each one has his own share in forming
them. In the enforcement of a rule thus formed no one can complain,
for it is the only rule which can be framed which gives equal expres-
sion to the voice of each.60
Carter acknowledged that parties often disagreed about the specific rule
to be derived from custom in a particular case, but he rarely conceded that
such clashing positions might be rooted in conflicting customs within the
community itself.61 Carter could not, of course, deny that there were
variations in conduct among individuals.62 He argued, however, that such
differences had largely disappeared as American society had progressed
toward universal norms of behavior embodying fair dealing and coopera-
55. DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, CODIFICATION: AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW
ACADEMY OF PHILADELPHIA 22 (Philadelphia, Law Acad. of Phila. 1886).
56. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 255.
57. Id. at 77-78. For an extended discussion by Carter on these points, see id. at 225-28.
58. See, e.g., CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 41; Carter, Ideal and Actual,
supra note 44, at 229.
59. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 48. Because New York judges were directly elected,
it was not quite as audacious to wrap them in the cloak of democracy as it would have been if they
were appointed.
60. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 143.
61. Id. at 78.
62. Id. at 123.
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tive self-restraint.63 When confronting examples of widespread conduct
that conflicted with these supposedly uniform habits and values, Carter
played semantic games, terming them "bad practices" rather than "cus-
toms."
64
In sum, Carter's argument, brewed in the cauldron of the codification
wars, was that there was an absolute identity between the common law
and "the social standard of justice," or "custom." "[C]ustom is not simply
one of the sources of law from which selections may be made and con-
verted into law by the independent and arbitrary fiat of a legislature or a
court, but... law, with the narrow exception of legislation, is custom. ' 65
Carter's view that each and every decision by a common law judge re-
flected shared ethical standards required him to describe the decision-
making process in a manner markedly different from Langdell.
IV. LANGDELL'S CLASSICAL ORTHODOXY
Before examining the contrasts between Carter's and Langdell's com-
mon law methodologies, it is necessary to review the contours of Lang-
dell's "classical orthodoxy." Professor Thomas Grey, the author of Lang-
dell's Orthodoxy, argues that "legal theories are defined by the relations
they establish among five possible goals of legal systems: comprehensive-
ness, completeness, formality, conceptual order and acceptability." 66 Ac-
cording to Grey's scheme, comprehensiveness concerns the ability of a le-
gal system, from a procedural perspective, to provide one and only one
resolution of every dispute within its jurisdiction. 67 The completeness of a
legal system describes the degree to which the system's substantive norms
provide a single "right" answer for every matter arising under it. Legal
systems fall short of completeness if they contain (as perhaps they inevita-
bly do) substantive gaps or inconsistencies that require decision makers to
exercise discretion. 68 Formality concerns the extent to which a legal sys-
tem dictates the correct resolution of cases according to "demonstrative
(rationally compelling) reasoning."69 Conceptual order refers to a legal
system's quality of having a limited body of coherently-related general
principles that themselves generate substantive bottom-level rules.7 ° Fi-
nally, the goal of acceptability is the pursuit of justice and wise policy. A
legal system is acceptable "to the extent that it fulfills the ideals and de-
63. See generally Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 602-14.
64. See id. at 613-14.
65. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 173.
66. Grey, supra note 5, at 6.
67. Id. at 6-7.
68. Id. at 7-8.
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 8-9.
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sires of those under its jurisdiction."'"
Comprehensiveness is the least important element in Grey's discussion
of Langdell's jurisprudence, for it is a procedural factor with no obvious
relationship to the other four, substantive goals. According to Grey, the
foundation for classical orthodoxy was the mutually reinforcing interplay
of the next three goals on his list: completeness, formality, and conceptual
order. 72 "The heart of classical theory was its aspiration that the legal sys-
tem be made complete through universal formality, and universally formal
through conceptual order.",73  The goal of acceptability was, in Grey's
view, irreducibly in tension with the logically ordered system represented
by the previous three goals. "To let considerations of acceptability di-
rectly justify a bottom-level rule or individual decision would violate the
requirement of conceptual order, on which the universal formality and
completeness of the system depended.,
74
According to Grey, Langdell's response to this tension was to push ac-
ceptability to the margins of his jurisprudence. In classical orthodox
thought, considerations of policy and morality were allowed into the sys-
tem at the level of general principles, but they influenced lower-level rules
and specific decisions only so long as they did not undermine universally
formal conceptual order.75 Consider, for example, the situation in which
one person promises another a reward for performing some task. Should
the promisor be able to revoke his offer if the promisee has almost, but not
entirely, completed the task? Langdell argued yes. He thought the sys-
tematic order of contract law, based on the principle of bargained-for con-
sideration, demanded this result even though it "may cause great hardship
and practical injustice. 7 6
Bruce Kimball's recent work takes issue with Grey's portrait of Lang-
dell. In a historiographic study of scholarship about Langdell, Kimball
criticizes Grey's heavy focus on Langdell's Summary of the Law of Con-
tracts, to the exclusion of his work in the fields of procedure, equity, and
commercial law and his law school casebooks.77 Kimball concludes,
"[C]lassical orthodoxy does not fully comprehend the complexity of Lang-
dell's jurisprudence, which needs to be reassessed in light of a broader and
71. Id. at 10.
72. These qualities are not necessarily dependent on each other. For example, informality does
not in and of itself prevent a legal system from being complete or conceptually ordered. Id. at 7-8, 8
n.27. Moreover, a lack of conceptual order does not invariably mean that a system is informal. Id. at
9 n.29.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id.
76. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 3-4 (2d ed.,
Rothman 1980) (1890).
77. Kimball, The Langdell Problem, supra note 13, at 316-22.
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deeper review of Langdell's writings, both published and archival. 78
In a subsequent article, Kimball conducts such a reassessment of Lang-
dell's contracts scholarship. He concludes: "Far from conforming to a
closed, formal system modeled on deductive logic or geometry, Langdell's
mode of reasoning.., is three dimensional, exhibiting a comprehensive
yet contradictory integration of induction from authority, deduction from
principle, and analysis of acceptability, including justice and policy. 79
Although Kimball in this article adds important texture to Grey's depiction
of Langdell, he does not remove the Harvard dean from the rank of classi-
cists. First of all, Kimball's own list of Langdell's significant contribu-
tions to contract doctrine includes several foundational features of classi-
cal contract law: the movement toward abstraction; the identification of
offer, acceptance, and consideration as the primary dimensions of con-
tract; and the introduction of the bargain theory of contract.80 Moreover,
Kimball ultimately makes quite tentative and modest claims about the role
of justice and policy in Langdell's jurisprudence. Although he points to
examples in which Langdell appealed to acceptability to supplement his
logical derivation of bottom-level rules,81 Kimball never goes so far as to
suggest that Langdell was willing to sacrifice formal conceptual reasoning
to reach a preferred result in a particular case. To the contrary, Kimball
acknowledges that Langdell "wanted to be, or felt he should be, a pure le-
gal formalist,"82 that he "remained committed to... inductive and parsi-
monious abstraction,"83 and that he thought the formal legal system "pro-
vides procedural consistency and evenhandedness, but does not aim at
substantive justice in the particular dispute."84
In short, even after Kimball's revision, Langdell remains firmly a clas-
sicist, at least in his contracts scholarship. Indeed, Kimball himself ap-
pears to conclude that Langdell was a "moral classicist" of the type identi-
fied by Siegel.85 Moreover, as I explain in the next section, there were
striking similarities between Langdell's classical common law vision and
David Dudley Field's proposed system of codification, at least as Carter
portrayed it. Carter's writings against the Civil Code thus indirectly dem-
onstrate the stark contrast between his own jurisprudence and that of
78. Id. at 323.
79. Kimball, Langdell on Contracts, supra note 10, at 390.
80. Id. at 346.
81. Id. at 382-86.
82. Id. at 391.
83. Id. at 394.
84. Id. at 395.
85. Id. Thomas Grey's scheme thus remains a helpful tool for analyzing Langdell's jurispru-
dence. Siegel has demonstrated that this scheme is useful for describing all classical legal thought, not
just the sterile, amoral variety Langdell has long been thought to embody. See Siegel, Joel Bishop's
Orthodoxy, supra note 10, at 220-23; Siegel, John Chipman Gray, supra note 10, at 1518-27.
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Langdell.86
V. CODE FORMALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
Carter depicted Field's code as striving for completeness, formality, and
conceptual order at the expense of equitable outcomes. Indeed, as exam-
ined in detail below,87 Carter's crusade against codification was, above all,
a battle against deductive reasoning. In his eyes, the primary advantage of
the common law approach over code systems was the power common law
judges possessed to resolve individual cases according to the demands of
justice. Whereas codification would compel courts to decide particular
matters by mechanical deduction from the principles and rules set forth in
the code, the common law achieved case-specific fairness by avoiding
such rigid formality. Although Carter mounted this justice-based defense
of the common law against Field, not Langdell, he might as well have
been arguing with the Harvard dean himself.
A. Formal Conceptualism in the Civil Law Tradition
Carter had good reason to equate codification with mechanical formal-
ism, for such logical rigidity characterized the legal systems of the many
civil law countries that had adopted codes over the previous hundred
years. The drafters of the Prussian Landrecht, enacted in 1794 under Fre-
derick the Great, intended their enormous code to be complete-that is, to
serve as the sole basis of decision for every case.88 The jurists who pre-
pared the French Civil Code of 1804 (the Code Napoleon) were aware of
the Prussians' utter failure to articulate a rule for every fact situation.
They thus embraced the much more modest goal of setting forth general
principles and maxims to be developed and applied by judges and jurists.
Nevertheless, the revolutionary impulses and rationalist tendencies of the
early nineteenth century shaped the reception of the Code Napolkon in
France and in the many other European and Latin American countries that
adopted it. In all these jurisdictions, the Code tended to be viewed as a
86. Carter himself never remarked on the similarities between code formalism and Langdell's
jurisprudence. Oliver Wendell Holmes did, however. In 1887, he remarked, "It has long seemed to
me that the ablest of the agitators for codification, [Englishman] Sir James Stephen, and the originator
of the present mode of teaching, Mr. Langdell, start from the same premises to reach seemingly oppo-
site conclusions. The number of legal principles is small, says, in effect, Sir James Stephen, therefore
codify them. The number of legal principles is small, says Mr. Langdell, therefore they may be taught
through the cases which have developed and established them." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Harvard
Law School: Judge Holmes' Oration, 3 L.Q. REV. 118, 121 (1887).
87. See infra Sections V.A., V.B.
88. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 29 (2d ed. 1987). The Landrecht of 1794 con-
tained over seventeen thousand provisions intended to resolve every possible dispute without any need
for judicial interpretation. This quixotic effort was, of course, a failure, as uncertainties arose and
courts were forced to interpret the code rather than apply it mechanistically. Id. at 29, 39.
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clear and complete source of all law. 89
In an influential work, The Civil Law Tradition, John Henry Merryman
describes the general views that civil law countries share about the nature,
source, and role of law. 9° The reality in civil law jurisdictions has always,
inevitably, strayed from these ideals. Nonetheless, nineteenth-century ju-
rists clung to these core principles stubbornly, even when violating them
in practice. Modem civil law theorists, by contrast, have assumed an in-
creasingly flexible attitude toward traditional civil law principles, although
Merryman contends that the pure model continues to shape their mindset
as a kind of "folklore." 91
At the center of the civil law tradition lay notions of legislative positiv-
ism and the separation of powers. Judges were meant to perform only the
relatively minor function of mechanically applying statutory provisions to
the facts at hand.92 The lawmaking power lay solely in the legislature and,
to the degree the legislature delegated it, in the executive and the adminis-
trative organs of the state. 93 In a codified legal system, such legislative
positivism demanded that the code be totally coherent, consistent, and
complete, so that judges had no room to make law themselves.94 The in-
sistence that judges not make law was joined to a related emphasis on the
importance of legal certainty. Civil law jurists believed that certainty was
best ensured by a decision-making process insulated from judicial discre-
tion.
89. Id. at 32-33. Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, influential nineteenth-century legal philoso-
phers in Great Britain, also shared the vision of a complete code, although they did not succeed in per-
suading their countrymen to enact one. MAURICE EUGEN LANG, CODIFICATION IN THE BRITISH
EMPIRE AND AMERICA 28-58 (1924). German jurists quarreled about the possible adoption of a uni-
fied national code throughout much of the nineteenth century. The debate commenced with a famous
1814 exchange between Thibaut and Savigny over the advisability of codification. Savigny, who op-
posed codification, prevailed in this dispute, and his arguments gave birth to the historical school of
jurisprudence. See generally Reimann, supra note 2. Nevertheless, a body of German jurists contin-
ued to push for codification, and they ultimately succeeded with the adoption of the German Civil
Code of 1896, which went into effect in 1900.
90. Merryman defines a legal "tradition" as "a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned atti-
tudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper or-
ganization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, stud-
ied, perfected, and taught." MERRYMAN, supra note 88, at 2.
91. See, e.g., id. at 46-47. By presenting my discussion of the civil law tradition in the past tense,
I thus do not intend to imply that the tradition is dead today.
92. Id. at 34-38; JOHN P. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 392 (1968). For similar views of the
judicial role among English and American codifiers, see 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, General View of the
Complete Code of Laws, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, 155, 210 (John Borwing ed., 1962);
COOK, supra note 2, at 83-87.
93. Civil law jurists also recognized, through various intellectual contortions, that custom was a
source of law, although a subsidiary and not especially significant one. MERRYMAN, supra note 88, at
23. Supporters of codification in America tended to downplay the importance of custom even in the
common law system they sought to replace. New York Civil Code supporter Robert Ludlow Fowler
remarked, "Even if Mr. Carter intended to refer to custom as a source of law, his reference entirely
overlooks the fact that custom has never, in this State, been in any way a fertile source of law."
ROBERT LUDLOW FOWLER, CODIFICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 9 (1884).
94. DAWSON, supra note 92, at 393-94; MERRYMAN, supra note 88, at 29.
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Another central feature of the civil law approach was its rejection of the
authority of judicial precedent. Stare decisis was flatly inconsistent with
civil law theorists' legislative positivism. Because judicial decisions were
not themselves sources of law, courts could not be bound by prior deci-
sions. 95 Moreover, while many common law jurists viewed the doctrine
of stare decisis as a foundation for certainty, their civil law counterparts
tended to see any judicial power over legal development as fostering un-
certainty. 96 Therefore, in civil law countries, unlike in common law juris-
dictions, there was no official judge-created body of law. Civil law judges
felt freer than their English and American counterparts to depart from
prior judicial interpretations of statutory provisions, even interpretations
by higher courts. 97
If the code was supposed to be the sole basis for deciding every case,
how did civil law jurists deal with situations in which there were gaps (la-
cuanae) in the code, or in which the strict application of code provisions
produced clearly inequitable results? In short, they adopted an approach
to code interpretation similar to the conceptual logical formalism of Lang-
dell's common law jurisprudence. James Herget and Stephen Wallace ex-
plain the dominant nineteenth-century civil law view concerning statutory
gaps:
For the positivists there was no gap problem. The positive laws, in-
cluding the authorized rules of construction and interpretation, were
the only sources to which a judge could resort in deciding a case....
In this view, the law could not logically have any gaps. Law was
autonomous, a closed universe of given rules. To admit of gaps
would be to admit that judges could decide cases according to some-
thing other than law! Positivists would concede that there could be
and were problems of legal construction and interpretation, and the
application of law to a particular case could sometimes be difficult.
But the problem was one of logic and the meaning of words. 98
Civil law thinkers manifested a similarly formalistic attitude toward the
problem of unfair outcomes. They recognized that resolving matters
through the mechanical application of code provisions would sacrifice
case-specific fairness, but the dominant view in the civil law tradition was
95. MERRYMAN, supra note 88, at 22, 36.
96. Id. at 49-50.
97. Id. at 46-47. Merryman notes that in modem practice, civil law judges are in fact influenced
by prior decisions, even though stare decisis is not central to the civil law approach, as it is to the
common law system. Id. at 47. See also DAWSON, supra note 92, at 400-31.
98. James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of
American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REv. 399, 404 (1987). Civil law jurisdictions have gradually ac-
cepted the inevitability of lacunae and the appropriateness of judicial interpretation when they occur.
However, to preserve the illusion that courts do not make law, many writers have extensively ex-
pounded on the supposedly nondiscretionary bases for such interpretation. See MERRYMAN, supra
note 88, at 43-46.
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(and remains today) that the interest of certainty outweighs that of eq-
uity. 99 Merryman explains:
In its general sense, equity refers to the power of the judge to mitigate
the harshness of strict application of a statute, or to allocate property
or responsibility according to the facts of the individual case.... It is
a recognition that broad rules, such as those commonly encountered
in statutes, occasionally work harshly or inadequately, and that some
problems are so complex that it is not possible for the legislature to
dictate the consequences of all possible permutations of the facts....
It clearly implies a grant of discretionary power to the judge. But in
the civil law tradition, to give discretionary power to the judge threat-
ens the certainty of the law. As a matter of legal theory, the position
has been taken that judges have no inherent equitable power. They
may from time to time be granted authority to use equity in the dispo-
sition of a case, but this grant of power will be expressly made and
carefully circumscribed in a statute enacted by the legislature. 100
Because equity was a legislative prerogative rather than a judicial one, a
judge was not free to pursue justice in an individual case by departing
from the clear application of an unambiguous provision. Describing the
attitude of the dominant "exegetical school" of French jurists in the latter
part of the nineteenth century, John P. Dawson writes, "It was improper to
mention 'equity,' to assess the weight of competing interests, or make es-
timates of consequences."' 0 ' Jaro Mayda terms the prevailing approach to
codes among nineteenth-century civil law jurists "exegetic positivism." In
his words, these jurists combined "the positivist myth that legislated law is
exclusive and self-sufficient" with the "exegetic method ... of erecting
upon the legislative text a system of concepts handled in closed circuit by
means of formal logic, independently of the changing world of facts." ' 2
At the end of the century, some French scholars challenged this domi-
nant mode of code interpretation. They recognized that "a mere self-
contained body of logical rules failed before the infinite variety of prob-
lems which progressing industrialisation in particular raised in France as
everywhere else."1 3 By far the most important such jurist was Frangois
Grny, who, in his influential Mthode d'Interpr~tation et Sources en Droit
Priv6 Positif (1899), argued that a judge confronted with a gap in the law
99. See generally MERRYMAN, supra note 88, at 48-55.
100. Id. at 49.
101. DAWSON, supra note 92, at 394. Modem civil law jurists generally agree that courts can
properly reinterpret statutory provisions to produce acceptable resolutions of cases in light of changing
social circumstances. MERRYMAN, supra note 88, at 45-46. It is important to recognize, however, that
such "evolutive interpretation" is deemed appropriate only when there is some ambiguity in the statute
requiring interpretation in the first place. Much of the scholarship regarding "evolutive interpretation"
is dedicated to establishing that such interpretation does not constitute judicial lawmaking. Id.
102. JARO MAYDA, FRAN(;OIS GtNY AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 5 (1978).
103. WOLFGANG GASTON FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 161 (1953).
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must freely search for the rule of decision among the needs and values of
society. 114
G~ny was followed in the early twentieth century by the German "free
law" school, including scholars such as Hermann Kantorowicz, Eugen
Ehrlich, and Ernst Fuchs. These jurists, who were vital inspirations for
Roscoe Pound and, through him, the American legal realists, expanded on
G~ny's arguments with reference to the German Civil Code, which went
into effect in 1900. They contended that the logical and conceptual
method of code interpretation was a deceptive cloak for creative judging.
They urged judges to candidly embrace their role as creative law makers
and, with the aid of social science, to base their decisions on sources out-
side the formal law. 105
The debate between Carter and Field took place in the 1880s, however,
without the benefit of these later insights by G~ny and the free law theo-
rists. In civil law countries that had embraced codes by that time, the vi-
sion of law as a logically deductive, self-contained system remained
largely unchallenged. Therefore, Carter and his allies naturally assumed
that codification would bring the same characteristics to New York law.
Because they saw the common law as flexible and equitable, and valued it
for these qualities, they were thus predisposed to oppose Field's efforts.
B. The Contest over the Significance ofAmerican Codification
1. Field's Modest Claims
Although Field and his allies eagerly trumpeted the proposed New York
Civil Code's coherence and clarity, they vigorously disclaimed any ambi-
tion of enacting a complete code that would be the exclusive source of
law, as were the codes of continental Europe. Field remarked:
What do we mean by codification? Not that which many lawyers
imagine it to be. They conjure up a phantom and then proceed to
curse it and to fight it. Their imaginations portray it as a body of en-
actments governing and intended to govern every transaction in hu-
man affairs, present and future, seen and unforseen [sic], universal,
unchangeable and exclusive. That is not our meaning. 106
Field frequently reiterated this point, on one occasion punctuating it with a
direct dig at Carter: "Nobody but an idiot supposes that."'' 0 7
The New York codifiers seem to have concluded that they had to frame
104. See MAYDA, supra note 102, at 5-6; Herget & Wallace, supra note 98, at 409-11.
105. On the free law movement, see Herget & Wallace, supra note 98, at 411-17. On its influ-
ence on Pound and the realists, see id. at 422-34.
106. Field, Codification, supra note 54, at 1-2.
107. REP. NINTH ANN. MEETING A.B.A. 68-69 (1886).
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their proposal as a moderate one to win support from at least some mem-
bers of the state's relatively conservative bar.' 0 8 Therefore, they usually
presented the prospect of codification in evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary terms.109 Field and his supporters frequently pointed out that the
Civil Code was made up primarily of principles and rules already settled
by common law judges.110 Moreover, as discussed below, they suggested
that the code would play a less dominant role in New York's legal system
than it did in civil law jurisdictions. Common law precedent would re-
main in force where not directly displaced by code provisions, and judges
would continue to serve a vital function. Field's proposal, they argued,
would thus make the law of the state more certain and accessible while re-
taining the common law's flexibility. 1 '
To preserve an important role for the common law, Field granted the
courts an important role in filling the Civil Code's gaps. He directly ad-
dressed the phenomenon of gaps in the code's introduction.
[I]f there be an existing rule of law omitted from this Code, and not
inconsistent with it, that rule will continue to exist in the same form
in which it now exists ... and if new cases arise, as they will, which
have not been foreseen, they may be decided, if decided at all, pre-
cisely as they would now be decided, that is to say, by analogy to
some rule in the Code, or to some rule omitted from the Code and
therefore still existing, or by the dictates of natural justice. 12
By rules "omitted from the Code and therefore still existing," Field meant
common law doctrines developed by the courts.
Civil law theorists would have agreed with Field so far as he asserted
that courts should decide cases not directly addressed by the code by using
analogies to code provisions or, as a last resort, the principles of natural
108. See, e.g., DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, A SHORT RESPONSE TO A LONG DISCOURSE: AN ANSWER
TO MR. JAMES C. CARTER'S PAMPHLET ON THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 8-9
(n.p. 1884) ("The objection once taken that [the Civil Code] proposed some changes... this objection
I say has been yielded to, in order to disarm the opposition; and as the Code now stands, it contains
only a few inconsiderable changes from the existing law, and these such only as I think every one must
admit to be desirable.").
109. See, e.g., id. at 9 ("The truth is that all the cry about there being something dangerous or
revolutionary in the Code is the offspring, either of malignant opposition, or ignorance, or of preju-
dice."). The New York codifiers' approach was thus very different from that of their counterparts in
California. The latter, in light of California's youth and its desire to achieve respect in other states and
in foreign nations, decided that it was strategically wise to present codification as a revolutionary ad-
vance. Grossman, California Mentality, supra note 2, at 635-39.
110. See, e.g., DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, LAW REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS INFLUENCE
ABROAD 17 (St. Louis, Review Publ'g 1891) ("Code, as used in [New York], does not mean a new
system of law, or indeed new laws at all, but merely a compilation of existing law with needed
amendments.").
11. This approach likely reflected not only political calculation, but also Field and his allies'
own common law breeding.
112. Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 28, at xix.
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law. 113 Field diverged from his continental counterparts, however, by also
allowing courts to continue to refer to the common law, a body of rules
derived solely from judicial precedents. 114 Robert Ludlow Fowler, the au-
thor of a major pamphlet supporting Field's code, reassured his readers
that codification would not "arrest the spontaneous development of the
common law." '115 He declared, "All writers on codification agree that the
development of new law beyond and in addition to that expressed in a
code is inevitable... "116 In other words, the common law would live on
to fill gaps in the code.
Lacunae were not the only problem intrinsic to codification, however;
there was also the dilemma of inequitable outcomes resulting from the di-
rect application of clearly applicable code provisions. As discussed above,
civil law theorists generally thought it was better to accept the occasional
unfair result than to sacrifice certainty or compromise legislative suprem-
acy. In the paragraph from the introduction to the Civil Code quoted
above, Field seemed to manifest a similar reluctance to permit courts to
stray from the direct application of statutory provisions; he allowed the
continuation of common law rules only when those rules were "not incon-
sistent with" code provisions.117 Fowler, however, suggested that courts
might look to common law precedents to modify an unjust result even if
the language of the Civil Code clearly dictated that result. He asserted that
the anticodifiers erred by
assuming that the Code provides for all cases and that new difficul-
ties, clearly beyond the equity of the statute, will be dealt with im-
properly. If codification were, in fact, to put an end to the proper so-
lution of new difficulties or to circumscribe the common law judicial
powers, we might well pause before entering upon systematic codifi-
cation. 118
The proposed Civil Code itself contained language demonstrating that
Field was not quite a purist with regard to legislative positivism. The code
was consistent with civil law theory so far as it declared: "Law is a rule of
113. MERRYMAN, supra note 88, at 44-45.
114. Interestingly, Field suggested that even if common law precedents were preserved to sup-
plement the code, his system still would not be complete, that is, it would not provide a solution for
every case. He noted, "In cases where the law is not declared by the Code... [and] an analogy cannot
be found, nor any [common law] rule which has been overlooked and omitted, then the courts will
have either to decide, as at present, without reference to any settled rule of law, or to leave the case
undecided, as was done by Lord MANSFIELD, in King v. Hay... trusting to future legislation for fu-
ture cases." Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 28, at xviii. See MERRYMAN, supra note 88, at 39-
40 (discussing similar approaches in France and Germany); Grey, supra note 5, at 7 n.20. Field thus
indicated that the legal system he proposed for New York was not only incomplete, but also not com-
prehensive-certain matters would simply remain unresolved.
115. FOWLER, supra note 93, at 52.
116. Id.
117. Supra text accompanying note 112.
118. FOWLER, supra note 93, at 18-19.
[19:149
20
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 2
Grossman
property and of conduct, prescribed by the sovereign power of the
state." "19 Civil law jurists would not, however, have agreed with the next
provision, which stated that "the will of the sovereign" was expressed not
only by the Constitution and by acts of the legislature and subordinate leg-
islative bodies, but also by "the judgments of the tribunals enforcing those
rules, which, though not enacted, form what is known as the customary or
common law."' 20
Field thus enshrined the authority of judicial precedent in a manner to-
tally alien to the civil law. He did not clearly explain in either his writings
or the code itself whether court decisions interpreting code provisions
should be treated as binding precedent. He left no doubt, however, that
cases not covered by the code would be decided "precisely as they would
now be decided,"' 2 ' that is, based on prior court decisions and the doctrine
of stare decisis (as well as by reference to other code provisions and natu-
ral justice).
Field's affirmation that the common law would survive codification, at
least in the code's interstices, seems curious in light of his repeated attacks
on the common law's "judge-made" character. '22 After all, one of Field's
primary arguments in favor of codification was that it would preserve the
separation of powers.' 23 There is obvious tension between Field's ac-
knowledgment of the continuing authority of judicial precedent and his ar-
gument that judicial lawmaking "will commend itself to no one in this
country of popular institutions where it is a fundamental idea that the func-
tions of government should be devolved upon distinct depart-
ments .... 124
Perhaps, as an intellectual matter, Field resolved this dissonance by
adopting John Austin's view that the legislature tacitly delegated its sover-
eign power to the courts for limited purposes. 125 Field himself does not
appear to have articulated this theory in writing. But Fowler, one of his
more jurisprudentially sophisticated supporters, referred to Austin's argu-
ment, remarking: "The analytical jurists have demonstrated that under any
advanced type of government laws are evolved in two modes, by the legis-
lature proper, and by the various subordinate persons possessing law-
119. THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 2 (Albany, Weed, Parsons 1865).
120. Id. § 3. The code then explicitly provided, "The evidence of the common law is found in the
decisions of the tribunals." Id. § 5.
121. Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 28, at xix.
122. See, e.g., id. at xxx; David Dudley Field, Reasons for the Adoption of the Codes, in I
SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 361, 368 (A.P.
Sprague ed., 1884) [hereinafter Field, Reasons for Adoption].
123. See supra text accompanying note 54; see also Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 28, at
xxi-xxiii, xxx-xxxi (other articulations of the separation of powers point).
124. Field, Reasons for Adoption, supra note 122, at 369.
125. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 35 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed.,
1995). See also PETER J. KING, UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICA 358, 364-66 (1986).
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making powers. Among the latter are the judges ... "'126
By denying that his code was meant to be a complete system of law,
Field resisted his opponents' charge that he was a grandiose idealist, dedi-
cated, like England's Jeremy Bentham, to extirpating the common law and
making the law judge-proof. The political advantages of Field's modest
pose were clear. It allowed code supporters to present Field's scheme as
an incremental, pragmatic step rather than a wholesale rejection of Anglo-
American jurisprudence. Fowler observed, "Mr. Field has always, in...
respect [to the issue of completeness], rejected the notions of his scientific
allies, thereby giving ... evidence of the eminently practical direction of
his labors."' 2 7
2. Carter's Depiction of Field as Legal Imperialist
By contrast, it behooved Carter, as the leader of the anticodification
forces, to magnify the differences between Field's proposal and the com-
mon law status quo. If the proponents of codification could persuade leg-
islators that the Civil Code was merely an inoffensive, sensible way to
make the law more certain and accessible, Carter and his colleagues would
have a difficult time defeating it. They thus had to present a convincing
case that Field's plan would suddenly, significantly, and detrimentally
transform New York's legal system.
As mentioned previously, Carter and his allies pointed accusingly to
numerous unacknowledged substantive alterations to the state's law con-
tained in Field's Civil Code. The anticodifiers argued not only that these
revisions would foster general confusion, but also that many of the par-
ticular changes were unwise, or even corrupt.' 28 But in Carter's view, the
real radicalism of Field's code lay not in its substantive content, but in its
ambition to provide the sole basis for deciding every single case. He con-
tended that the code would supplant decisional law more completely than
Field acknowledged and would reduce judges' role to the mechanical ap-
plication of statutory language. In short, Carter attempted to portray
Field's Civil Code as an arrogant, grand scheme that would render New
York's legal system indistinguishable from that of Napoleon's. 12 9
Carter's portrait of Field as a jurisprudential revolutionary hinged on his
assertion that Field intended the Civil Code to be a complete system of
law. Carter sneered at his rival's claim that the code did not profess to
126. FOWLER, supra note 93, at 9.
127. Id. at 52. Fowler makes clear that by "scientific" codifiers, he means Bentham and Austin,
among others. Id. at 40-41.
128. See supra text accompanying note 41.
129. Carter frequently emphasized that codes were characteristic of despotic states, whereas the
common law typified democracies and free societies. See, e.g., CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION,
supra note 43, at 6-9.
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provide for all future cases, but only "to give the general rules upon the
subjects to which it relates, which are now known and recognized."'130
Field could have put such an explicit limitation in the code itself, Carter
observed, but he did not do so, because "this would have utterly destroyed
his code, qua code, by converting it into a ridiculous digest."'' Carter
concluded that Field "either did not mean that his code should have the
limited operation he asserts for it, or he intended to conceal his meaning
while he was urging its adoption." 132
Carter argued that a complete code was simply incompatible with jus-
tice, for no code could ever contain a sufficient number of rules to fairly
resolve every dispute that might arise. He summarized the problem as fol-
lows:
Codification ... consists in enacting rules, and such rules must,...
from their very nature, cover future and unknown, as well as past and
known cases; and so far as it covers future and unknown cases, it is
no law that deserves the name. It does not embody justice; it is a
mere jump in the dark; it is a violent framing of rules without refer-
ence to justice, which may or may not rightly dispose of the cases
which may fall under them. '33
In the introduction to his Civil Code, Field disclaimed any intent to offer
a rule for every case. He asserted that the code "cannot provide for all
possible cases which the future may disclose. It does not profess to pro-
vide for them. All that it professes is to give the general rules upon the
subjects to which it relates which are now known and recognised."' 34
Carter pointedly responded that the code's generality was in fact its most
insidious feature.
This notion that the operation of a rule may be restricted by making it
more general, seems highly absurd. Every one must see that the more
general an enacted rule is, the more of future unknown cases it will
cover. Suppose a general rule were enacted that promises made upon
consideration were binding. This, if it is made to mean anything,
means that all such promises are binding, and the rule would cover a
multitude of invalid promises, such as those made by infants or in-
sane persons, or fraudulent promises, or promises against public pol-
icy. 1
35
A code could be universally fair only by setting forth every exception to
every rule, and then every exception to every exception. As Carter ob-
130. Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 28, at xviii.
131. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 274.
132. Id. at 274.
133. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 33.
134. Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 28, at xviii.
135. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 274.
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served, drafting such a code was an impossible task, because the complex
affairs of society generated an innumerable variety of disputes and thus an
innumerable variety of ethical problems. 136 In short, Carter concluded that
because the very process of reasoning from the general to the particular
conflicted with the demands of justice, codification would inevitably pro-
duce unfair outcomes.
3. The Derogation Rule and the Example of California
Carter's assertion that the Civil Code's text alone would dictate the re-
sult of almost every case had a firm basis in the language of the draft code
itself. The provision affirming the continuing authority of the common
law, discussed above,' 37 seemed to be largely negated by two other provi-
sions. One of these stated, "In this State there is no common law, in any
case, where the law is declared by the five Codes."' 3 8 In other words, the
code would sweep away all judicial precedents in its path. Another sec-
tion ensured that this path would be a wide one. It declared, "The rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, has
no application to this Code." '139 This provision was critical, for the com-
pleteness of the code hinged on it.
The Civil Code's provision regarding derogation abandoned a canon of
statutory construction generally observed by American courts. As one late
nineteenth-century treatise writer wrote, "[I]n this country, the rule has as-
sumed the form of a dogma, that all statutes in derogation of the common
law, or out of the course of the common law, are to be construed
strictly." 4 ° Another scholar elaborated, "It is not presumed that the legis-
lature intended to make any innovation upon the common law further than
the necessity of the case required."''
California, which, as discussed above, enacted a revised version of
Field's Civil Code in 1872, ultimately embraced the derogation rule in an
effort to combine the benefits of codification with the flexibility and fair-
136. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 36.
137. Supra text accompanying note 120.
138. CIVILCODE, supra note 119 §6.
139. Id. § 2032. Interestingly, sections 6 and 2032 appeared almost as far apart in the Civil Code
as possible; the latter was the third-to-last section. It is possible that Field separated them to obscure
their combined impact.
140. G.A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 174 (1888).
141. 2 JOHN LEWIS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 862 (2d
ed. 1904). This appears to be a paraphrase of I JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 464
(New York, 0. Halsted 1826). Roscoe Pound later condemned the derogation rule as an obstacle to
necessary legislative innovation. He researched its history and acidly concluded that "this wise and
ancient rule of the common law is, in substance, an American product of the nineteenth century,"
rooted in judicial antipathy toward legislative intrusion. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legisla-
tion, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 402 (1908). As discussed below, however, in the context of the codifica-
tion debate, the derogation rule was embraced not to undermine progressive legislation, but to preserve
for codified jurisdictions the flexibility and fairness of common law decision making.
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ness of common law decision making. In 1884, John Norton Pomeroy, an
eminent treatise writer and the first dean of the Hastings College of Law,
published an influential multipart article entitled The True Method of In-
terpreting the Civil Code, in which he opposed making the Civil Code the
sole, or even the primary, source of California law. He argued that judges
should instead view the Civil Code, whenever possible, as merely a decla-
ration of existing common law rules and interpret it using common law
precedents.
Except in the comparatively few instances where the language is so
clear and unequivocal as to leave no doubt of an intention to depart
from, alter, or abrogate the common-law rule concerning the subject
matter, the courts should avowedly adopt and follow without devia-
tion the uniform principle of interpreting all the definitions, state-
ments of doctrines, and rules contained in the code in complete con-
formity with the common-law definitions, doctrines, and rules, and as
to all the subordinate effects resulting from such interpretations. 142
As one scholar has observed, Pomeroy's purpose was to establish a
method by which the code would be read "as completely as possible as if
it did not change a thing." 143  The California Supreme Court explicitly
adopted Pomeroy's interpretive method in 1888.144
In 1885, shortly after Pomeroy's death, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York's Special Committee to Urge the Rejection of the Pro-
posed Civil Code resolved that Pomeroy's article be reprinted and circu-
lated in New York to illustrate the dangers of enacting Field's code. The
ABCNY issued it as a pamphlet titled The "Civil Code" in California.
Because the Civil Code enacted in California was largely identical to the
New York draft, Pomeroy's criticisms were especially useful to the New
142. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, THE 'CIVIL CODE' IN CALIFORNIA 51 (1885) (reprint of John Nor-
ton Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting the Civil Code, 3 W. COAST REP. 585, 657, 691, 717
(1884); 4 W. COAST REP. 1, 49, 109, 145 (1884)). Although the language of the California Civil Code
offered a somewhat better basis for Pomeroy's interpretive approach than did Field's New York draft,
it was hardly clear what method of interpretation the California version called for. The California
Code Commissioners had added a section to Field's code stating, "The provisions of this Code, so far
as they are substantially the same as . . . the common law, must be construed as continuations thereof,
and not as new enactments." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 (1872). However, this section, which seemed to
support the application of the derogation doctrine championed by Pomeroy, was paired with one re-
voking the doctrine in language equivalent to that in the Field code. Id. § 4 (1872). The relationship
between these apparently inconsistent provisions was perplexing. Not surprisingly, Pomeroy did not
refer to them at all in setting forth his argument. For a general discussion of the complicated relation-
ship between the California Civil Code and the common law, see Izhak Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab
Co.-A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the California Civil Code, 65 CAL. L. REV. 4 (1977).
143. William B. Fisch, The Dakota Civil Code: More Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 45
N.D. L. REV. 9,29 (1968).
144. Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345 (Cal. 1888). The Sharon court's embrace of Pomeroy's mode of
interpretation was, however, apparently limited to unclear code provisions, like the one at issue in that
case. The court did not consider Pomeroy's contention that even an unambiguous code provision
should be construed as a continuation of the common law, including subordinate common law rules
inconsistent with the code's text.
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Yorkers' anticodification campaign. 45  He blasted Field's work as a
bramble of "defects, imperfections, omissions, and ... inconsistencies,"
the uncertainty of which was exacerbated by the drafters' "unnecessary
practice of abandoning well-known legal terms and phrases... and of
adopting instead thereof an unknown and hitherto unused language and
terminology."' 146 Pomeroy argued that the theory of interpretation he rec-
ommended would ameliorate the confusion caused by these flaws. 141
More important for purposes of this discussion, Pomeroy also criticized
the overgenerality of the Civil Code's provisions.
In considering the language of the civil code, the fact must be con-
stantly remembered that it does not purport to embody in a statutory
form all of the existing rules of the law upon any subject whatsoever.
It contains only general definitions, the statements of general doc-
trines, and a few very special rules. The great mass of the special
rules of the law, applicable to particular circumstances, may be to
some extent inferences from the doctrines which are formulated, but
they are certainly not expressed in the text of the code.'48
Pomeroy argued that because the Civil Code omitted most rules govern-
ing particular fact situations, it engendered unfair outcomes. He ex-
plained, "Statutory rules once enacted cannot be readily modified and ex-
panded by the courts so as to cover new facts and relations not included
within their expressed terms."149 Pomeroy asserted that this rigidity was a
major flaw, for an ideal legal system "should be flexible, containing provi-
sions for exceptions to [its] general requirements, so that when a case does
not fall within the reason, although it may within the letter, of a regulation,
it shall not be controlled by such rule contrary to justice and equity."' 50
In Pomeroy's view, if a codified doctrine were "interpreted textually,
with no reference to the pre-existing law," it would be "rigid and inflexi-
ble in its operation, and capable of applying to one condition of fact
alone."'' Consequently, "[a]ll the flexibility, justice, and equity of the
common law doctrine would be lost at one blow. ' 2 Pomeroy contended
that the only way to solve this problem was by embracing a strong version
145. In a prefatory note to the pamphlet, the special committee remarked that because the Califor-
nia code was "for the most part, a copy" of Field's proposed Civil Code for New York, Pomeroy's
conclusions were "of peculiar value to the legislators of New York, and to all others whose duty or
curiosity may excite in them an interest in the question of Codification of the Common Law." Special
Committee of the New York City Bar Association to Urge the Rejection of the Proposed Civil Code,
Introduction to POMEROY, supra note 142, at 3.
146. POMEROY, supra note 142, at 6-7.
147. Id. at 7.
148. Id. at 32.
149. Id. at 53.
150. Id. (quoting from his own treatise, MUNICIPAL LAW).
151. Id. at 55.
152. Id..
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of the derogation rule, that is, "by interpreting all the provisions of the
code as declaratory of the common law or equitable doctrines and rules,
unless the intent to make a change clearly appears from the unequivocal
language of the text."153 In other words, judges should reject a direct tex-
tual approach and instead read each code provision as "simply declaratory
of the established common law general doctrine, without modification," so
that "all the special rules on the subject, laid down by the courts, by which
persons are declared to be liable under a great variety of special circum-
"'154stances, would still remain in full force ....
In short, Pomeroy maintained that the Civil Code should play an ex-
tremely minimal role in California's legal system. He urged judges to turn
to the common law, not only to clarify ambiguities and resolve conflicts in
the code, but also to derive lower-level rules that were flatly inconsistent
with the code's general language. He asserted that courts should not "in-
terpret each provision of the code textually, according to its literal terms,
without reference to the pre-existing law or equity."' 155 Pomeroy's court-
centered vision of code interpretation stood in stark contrast to the legisla-
tive positivism of civil law jurists, and his condemnation of how the Civil
Code's general provisions produced unfair outcomes in specific cases
posed a challenge to all European-style codification.
Although Pomeroy and Carter, working on opposite coasts, appear to
have arrived at their conclusions independently, they offered many parallel
arguments. 156  Carter echoed Pomeroy's criticisms of the Civil Code's
ambiguities and gaps.' 57 More important, Carter voiced similar concerns
about the code's excessive generality. He, too, believed that the instru-
ment's broadly-stated provisions were ill-equipped to address the manifold
variety of factual circumstances confronted by courts. Indeed, Carter took
this argument farther than Pomeroy; whereas the Californian did not reject
the theoretical possibility of a satisfactory complete codification,' 58 Carter
argued that justice was so fact-specific that no code could, even in theory,
resolve every case fairly. In other words, because the very notion of codi-
153. Id. at 62.
154. Id. at 63.
155. Id. at 62.
156. Carter apparently wrote his first anticodification pamphlet, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF
OUR COMMON LAW, in late 1883, and it was published in early 1884. Pomeroy's series of articles
appeared in the WEST COAST REPORTER shortly afterward, in September and October 1884. Neither
author mentioned the other in these works.
157. See, e.g., CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 104 (The Civil Code's provi-
sions on the Law of General Averages are "heavily charged with both mischievous uncertainty and
with positive error."); CARTER, ARGUMENT, supra note 43, at 24 (quoting Pomeroy's assertion that the
code was "full of defects, imperfections, omissions, and even inconsistencies").
158. See POMEROY, supra note 142, at 67 ("It may be possible to draw up a code of the private
civil jurisprudence, to which the principle of interpretation which I have thus advocated would not
necessarily apply.") Nevertheless, Pomeroy indicated that it would be extraordinarily difficult to draft
a code clear, complete, and flexible enough to make his nonderogation approach unnecessary.
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fication implied some degree of generalization, codification was incom-
patible with justice. 59
Carter, like Pomeroy, believed that the liberal application of the deroga-
tion doctrine would help assuage the problems caused by codification, and
he highlighted the Civil Code's express abrogation of the derogation rule
as evidence of Field's jurisprudential imperialism.16° However, unlike
Pomeroy, who was attempting to minimize the negative effects of an al-
ready-enacted code, Carter was fighting to prevent codification from oc-
curring in the first place. Therefore, instead of dwelling on the benefits of
the derogation rule, 161 Carter concentrated on preserving New York's un-
codified status. 162 Nevertheless, Pomeroy and Carter made essentially the
same argument, namely, that a code unmoored from the common law was
deficient because cases decided under it were resolved, based not on the
justice of the particular situation, but on cold deduction from principles
and rules.
In light of this reasoning, Carter's outrage at the prospect of codification
would have been hollow if the common law was itself characterized by
soulless logical reasoning. He had to explain how the common law, unlike
a code system, provided case-specific justice. In doing so, Carter, as
shown below, painted a most un-Langdellian portrait of the manner in
which common law judges decided cases.
VI. CARTER'S UN-LANGDELLIAN COMMON LAW METHODOLOGY
Both Langdell and Carter recognized that deducing the solution to spe-
cific cases from general rules was sometimes incompatible with justice.
They responded to this tension in opposite ways, however. Langdell, in
Thomas Grey's terms, permitted "acceptability... to influence decision
only subject to the constraint of universally formal conceptual order."' 163
159. See infra Section VI.B.
160. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 308.
161. In contrast to Pomeroy, Carter did not discuss the derogation rule extensively. Roscoe
Pound was thus wrong when he caustically identified Carter as one of the leading proponents of the
rule. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591,
601 (1911). Pound intimated that Carter's support of the doctrine was part of a general attack on pro-
gressive legislation. In fact, however, Carter discussed the derogation rule in a context wholly unre-
lated to progressive reform. He pointed to the Civil Code's explicit renunciation of the rule simply to
support his contention that Field intended to totally uproot the common law. CARTER, ORIGIN,
GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 308-10.
162. If the New York legislature had adopted Field's code, New York courts would have had
more trouble than California courts concluding that the derogation principle should guide code inter-
pretation. While both the California Civil Code and Field's New York draft contained explicit rejec-
tions of the derogation principle, the California version, unlike the New York one, counterbalanced
this provision with another declaring, "The provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the
same as . . . the common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments."
See supra note 142.
163. Grey, supra note 5, at 15. The same could be said of Langdell's classicist disciple on the
Harvard faculty, Samuel Williston. Williston observed, "[l]n trying to do justice between parties to a
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Carter, in a reversal of this formula, believed that formal conceptual order
should affect the resolution of particular cases only subject to the con-
straint of acceptability.
Impelled by his opposition to codification, Carter thus articulated a vi-
sion of the common law that is difficult to characterize as classical at all.
In Grey's terms, "[T]he heart of classical theory was its aspiration that the
legal system be made complete through universal formality, and univer-
sally formal through conceptual order."' 6  Carter certainly viewed the
common law as a complete legal system, that is, one that provided a cor-
rect solution for each and every case. In his mind, however, neither con-
ceptual order nor formal reasoning was a significant factor in the common
law's completeness. Allusions to the conceptual and formal aspects of the
common law occasionally appeared in Carter's writings, just as references
to justice sometimes showed up in Langdell's. But for Carter, conceptual
and formal considerations were never especially important and were al-
ways strictly subsidiary to the goal of resolving each case equitably.
Carter was not an amoral classicist, or even a moral classicist, but a non-
classical moralist.
Carter's portrait of common law decision making is, in critical respects,
one that most modem scholars would not associate with Gilded Age ju-
rists. It is, instead, reminiscent of the legal realists who rebelled against
Langdell's legacy in the twentieth century. When reading the following
examination of Carter's common law method, it is interesting to keep in
mind that many aspects of his approach-his anticonceptualism, his anti-
formalism and rule skepticism, his restrictive approach to stare decisis, his
belief in the importance of extralegal sources-anticipated trends usually
thought not to have flowered in the United States until after his death.
Later in this Article, I will address the similarities between Carter and the
legal realists in detail. 165
A. Carter's Rejection of Conceptualist Formalism
Thomas Grey explains, "A legal system is conceptually ordered to the
extent that its substantive bottom-level rules can be derived from a small
number of relatively abstract principles and concepts, which themselves
form a coherent system."' 166 By this definition, Carter's common law was
litigation ... the law may suffer in consequence of a distinction whose only validity is that in the case
before the court, justice happens to be with one party." SAMUEL J. WILLISTON, SOME MODERN
TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 85 (1986). Williston, however, expressed more ambivalence than Langdell
about the desirability of sacrificing equity for formal order. He remarked, "[L]ogic is likely to be fol-
lowed at least to the point that it produces practically undesirable results. Sometimes certainly it has
been followed beyond this point." Id. at 155.
164. Grey, supra note 5, at 11.
165. Infra Section VIII.
166. Grey, supra note 5, at 8.
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an almost entirely nonconceptualist system.
Carter sometimes paid lip service to the benefits of systematic order in
law. For example, even as he rejected codification, he acknowledged:
A book containing a statement in the manner of a Digest, and in ana-
lytical and systematic form of the whole unwritten law, expressed in
accurate, scientific language, is indeed a thing which the legal profes-
sion has yearned after.... It would refresh the failing memory, re-
produce in the mind its forgotten acquisitions, exhibit the body of the
law, so as to enable a view to be had of the whole, and of the relation
of the several parts. '67
On another occasion, Carter observed that "whoever aspires to be a thor-
oughly accomplished lawyer" must "comprehend [legal] rules as parts of a
classified and orderly system exhibiting the law as a science." 
1 68
However, Carter never viewed the systematic presentation of law as
more than a somewhat useful mneumonic device and research aid for
practicing lawyers. He did not believe that a desire for conceptual order
had shaped the common law in the past, and he vigorously rejected any
attempt to allow such an aspiration to guide its development in the future.
He derided English codifiers, like Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and
James Fitzjames Stephen, who complained that the common law was
"destitute of system."169
Their views ... are the views of professors of law, whose lives are
devoted, not like those of lawyers and judges, to the practical admini-
stration of law, but to teaching it, and lecturing about it.... The de-
fect thus suggested is, in a practical point of view, of but a moderate
degree of importance. If justice is, in fact, in any nation well admin-
istered, if the affairs of men are regulated by a wise and cultivated
body of legal rules, and if these can be learned by the professional
class with such certainty as to enable it to furnish trustworthy advice
and guidance, the mere circumstance that such rules cannot be found
set down in words and arranged in orderly and systematic form, is
not, of itself, a very serious matter. 7 0
Carter rejected the notion that rules of decision were logically deduced
from a coherent system of abstract principles. He mocked Bentham for
"imagin[ing] that a system of law could be created per saltum by spinning
out through purely logical processes the consequences of a series of origi-
nal intellectual conceptions."''
The lack of conceptualism in Carter's common law jurisprudence
167. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 96-97.
168. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 1.
169. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 71.
170. Id. at 72-73.
171. Id. at 70.
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emerges clearly from his descriptions of how courts resolved cases for
which there was no direct precedent. Classicists suggested that judges ad-
dressed such situations by determining the appropriate top-level general
principle and then deductively deriving a lower-level rule for the case at
hand from that principle. In 1891, Ezra Thayer (who would later become
Dean of Harvard Law School) described the process as follows:
If the present facts do not directly fall within any case, or any hard-
and-fast rule already settled, the first inquiry of the judge is for de-
cided cases similar to this. Instances are produced, each showing the
law on a particular state of facts, and presenting an analogy to the
case in hand more or less direct. These cases are scrutinized, classi-
fied, distinguished; the wider principles which they illustrate, and
which are claimed by the contending parties to include the present
case, are determined and tested by a comparison with other branches
of the law; and thus a decision is finally reached. '72
Thayer thought that this entire process-both the "extraction" of the
broader principle from the precedents and the correct resolution of the
case at hand by deduction from that principle-were formal and nondis-
cretionary.
It is true that with a new state of facts it is in a sense impossible to
say, under our system, that the law exists before the case is decided.
Yet if principles exist which make it certain how the case will be de-
cided, it is the same, from a practical point of view, as if the law pre-
viously existed.173
Carter occasionally described the common law method for deciding new
cases in a way that, on the surface, seemed somewhat similar to the classi-
cal approach. For example, he wrote:
Judges and advocates-all together--engage in the search. Cases
more or less nearly approaching the one in controversy are adduced.
Analogies are referred to. The custom and habits of men are ap-
pealed to. Principles already settled as fundamental are invoked and
run out to their consequences; and finally a rule is deduced which is
declared to be the one which the existing law requires to be applied to
the case. 174
Carter's references to "rules" and "analogies" and "deduction" give a
formal veneer to this passage, the most classical account of common law
decision making he ever articulated. But even here, his allusion to "cus-
toms and habits" hints at the profound difference between his approach
172. Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of the
Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172, 182 (1891).
173. Id. at 181 n.2. Thayer repeatedly uses the word "extract" to describe the first stage of the
process. Id. at 182-84.
174. Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 44, at 224.
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and that of Langdell, who denied considerations of "acceptability" any de-
terminative force in the lower levels of his system. Indeed, immediately
following this passage, Carter elaborated on his description in a way that
further manifested the contrast between him and the classicists.
In all this, the things which are plain and palpable are, (1) that the
whole process consists in a search to find a rule; (2) that the rule thus
sought for is the just rule-that is to say, the rule most in accordance
with the sense ofjustice of those engaged in the search; (3) that it is
tacitly assumed that the sense of justice is the same in all those who
are thus engaged-that is to say, that they have a common standard
ofjustice from which they can argue with, and endeavor to persuade
each other; (4) that the field of search is the habits, customs, business
and manners of the people, and those previously declared rules which
have sprung out of previous similar inquiries into habits, customs,
business and manners. 175
As Thomas Grey observes, Langdell excluded fairness concerns from
the lower levels of his system because "to let considerations of acceptabil-
ity directly justify a bottom-level rule or individual decision would violate
the requirement of conceptual order, on which the universal formality and
completeness of the system depended."' 176 By contrast, Carter welcomed
direct considerations of the customary standard of justice into the lower
levels of his system--conceptual order be damned.
Carter often seemed to omit higher-level abstract concepts from his
common law jurisprudence altogether. In the classical orthodox approach,
there were relatively few general principles (concepts such as considera-
tion in contract and proximate cause in tort), but they were numerous
enough to form a coherent system unto themselves and occupy law stu-
dents for three full years. 177 Carter, by contrast, reasoned down from just
one broad principle: be fair. In his own words, "Apart from, and inde-
pendent of, known facts, there is no such thing, in human apprehension, as
law, except the broad and empty generalization that justice must be
done."'178
The classicist Ezra Thayer identified Carter's neglect of principles and
rules as the chief flaw in his jurisprudence. After criticizing Bentham for
focusing only on abstract rules and overlooking their application to facts,
Thayer continued:
Some of [Bentham's] opponents, on the other hand, lay hold of what
may be called the fact end of the process, the end which is especially
emphasized by common-law methods, and forget the rule.... Mr.
175. Id.
176. Grey, supra note 5, at 15.
177. See id. at 9 (identifying consideration and proximate cause as classical concepts).
178. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 26.
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Carter... seems especially open to this charge of considering only
the facts on the one hand and the source of law [that is, custom] on
the other, and of squeezing out, so to speak, the tertium quid, the rule
itself, which lies between. 
179
The contrast between Carter and Langdell is exemplified by their re-
spective discussions of ratified infant contracts, the one legal problem they
both addressed at some length. Under the common law, a minor (an "in-
fant" in legal parlance) lacks capacity to contract, and any contract he en-
ters into is therefore voidable. In other words, if an individual enters into
a contract with a minor and then sues under the contract, the minor can
successfully defend himself by pleading the defense of infancy. What is
the correct result, however, if the defendant, out of the goodness of his
heart, reaffirms his contractual obligation after he reaches the age of ma-
jority and is then sued under the contract? In general, promises made
without consideration are not actionable. Nevertheless, since 1586, the
common law has treated such ratified infant contracts as binding. 18
Langdell's and Carter's explanations for this result were markedly differ-
ent.
Langdell derived almost all of contract law from the principle of bar-
gained-for consideration. Consequently, he embraced the common law's
longstanding view that a promise is not binding if the promisor is simply
affirming the existence of a moral obligation to perform. 181 In such an in-
stance, even if the promisee previously provided the promisor with some-
thing of value, no contract exists because the current (renewed) promise
did not induce the consideration.182 Langdell criticized the contrary posi-
tion, adopted by the great English jurist Lord Mansfield.
Whether [Mansfield's] theory was that the antecedent moral obliga-
tion furnished a sufficient consideration for the promise, or that such
a promise was binding without a consideration, may not be clear; but
the former theory is the one that has commonly been attributed to
him, and hence the moral obligation which was supposed to make the
promise binding has acquired the name of moral consideration. The
other theory, however, would have been less untenable, and less mis-
chievous in its tendency. It would indeed have been liable to the se-
rious objection of involving judicial legislation, but the theory of
moral consideration was liable to the much greater objection, at least
in a scientific point of view, that it could only succeed at the expense
179. Thayer, supra note 172, at 198.
180. Edmonds v. Barton, 3 Leon. 164, 74 Eng. Rep. 608 (K.B. 1586).
181. LANGDELL, supra note 76, at 89-90.
182. See Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99,
118-21 (2000).
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of involving a fundamental legal doctrine in infinite confusion. '83
In Langdell's eyes, Mansfield was not only wrong, but wrong in a way
that undermined the conceptual order of the common law of contracts.
Still, Langdell had to confront the inconvenient fact that courts, in
Mansfield's time and since, actually did enforce various types of gratui-
tous promises to do what the promisor was already under a moral obliga-
tion to do-including, for example, promises to pay debts contracted dur-
ing infancy.'84 Langdell struggled to justify the courts' recognition of
ratified infant contracts in a manner consistent with his scientific ap-
proach. In other words, he sought to explain the doctrine in a way that
neither violated the principle of bargained-for consideration nor depended
on the courts' moral judgment. He arrived at the following rationalization:
The contract of an infant, not being void, but merely voidable, can be
ratified by the infant after he comes of age, and a new promise oper-
ates as a ratification. The action, however, must be brought on the
original contract, and the new promise must be used simply to repel
the defence of infancy in the event of its being pleaded. '85
Langdell thus unpersuasively suggested that the upholding of ratified in-
fant contracts was the inexorable result of logical deduction from higher
principles.
Carter, by contrast, felt no impulse to force this problem into a concep-
tual scheme. It is worth quoting Carter's analysis at length to highlight the
difference between him and Langdell.
What did the judge do to whom the case was first submitted of a con-
tract made by an infant and ratified after he became of age? He ob-
served that it was an infant's contract, and therefore at first it seemed
assignable to [that] excepted class; but he noticed the new feature of
ratification after full age. He recurred to the instances which made
up the class of infants' contracts. He found that none of them exhib-
ited this feature. He then inquired whether that feature was a mate-
rial one; that is to say, whether the case ought to go into the same
class with the others, or into a new class to be made for it with differ-
ent legal consequences for its characteristic. In this inquiry the action
of his predecessors supplied him with no controlling guide. He was
obliged to determine for himself. And what was the real problem
which he had to solve? Simply this: what does justice require? He
was to apply to this case the social standard of justice; not simply to
repeat what had been done before, but to make an original application
183. LANGDELL, supra note 76, at 89.
184. Other examples provided by Mansfield and noted by Langdell were promises to pay debts
barred by the statute of limitations and promises by bankrupt individuals to pay debts from which they
had been discharged. Id.
185. Id.at9l.
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of it. He was not, however, without aids which his existing knowl-
edge supplied. He found indeed that there was no new consideration
for the ratification; but he also found that, in prior cases, the courts
had enforced promises in the nature of ratification. He found that the
original consideration was perfect, and the subsequent ratification
sufficient evidence that the original contract was not tainted with any
unfairness or imposition. Justice, as he understood it (and his under-
standing presumably represented that of the society in which he
lived), required that this contract should be performed; in other
words, that a new class be made for such cases. 186
In this passage, Carter makes nods to formal reasoning, and even concep-
tual reasoning, but these elements ultimately bend to the needs of justice-
not, as for Langdell, the other way around.
B. "Rules Are Made For Fools"
Carter traveled extensively overseas with John Cadwalader, a prominent
New York City lawyer and perhaps his closest friend. On one such occa-
sion, when they were vacationing together at a hunting lodge in Scotland,
Cadwalader wrote a letter home in which he remarked, "Carter says-who
plays Bridge according to his own rules-that Rules were made for
fools."' 87
In law, as in card games. Carter frequently exhibited a striking degree
of skepticism about legal rules. In other words, he rejected not only con-
ceptualist formalism, but even nonconceptualist formalism. A legal sys-
tem does not have to conceptualist to be formal. A jurist may embrace
concrete bottom-level rules without demanding that they be derived from a
coherent system of higher level principles. As Thomas Grey remarks,
"Non-conceptualist formalism is a common attitude among lawyers; they
want clear rules, but place little importance on more abstract doctrinal
formulations."' 88 Carter, however, often seemed to deny the very possi-
bility of determinate legal rules.
As discussed above, Carter argued that the main problem with codifica-
tion was the injustice that inevitably resulted when courts applied general
rules to particular circumstances. Carter sometimes followed this line of
reasoning to its ultimate conclusion-a rejection of legal rules themselves.
It is of the essence of a... rule that it creates, or supposes, a class of
instances to which it is to be applied. The class may be narrowly and
cautiously limited; but within its scope it embraces future and un-
known, as well as present and known cases. The essential nature of
186. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 26-27.
187. Letter from Cadwalader to S. Weir Mitchell (Sept. 28, 1902) (College of Physicians of Phila-
delphia, S. Weir Mitchell Papers, Box 6, Item # 14).
188. Grey, supra note 5, at 9 n.29.
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classification consists of selecting qualities of objects, and declaring
that all which possess such qualities, whatever others they may ex-
hibit, belong to the class. When, therefore, any case arises for dispo-
sition under a Code, if it present the features belonging to a class cre-
ated by it, it must be dealt with the same as other instances in that
class, no matter what additional and theretofore unknown features it
may present, which ought to subject, and would have subjected, it to
a wholly different disposition, had the new features been present to
the mind of the codifier.... No rule whatever can be framed which
will not do this. 189
Carter maintained that the common law was superior to a code system
precisely because it could resolve every matter equitably, in light of the
particular facts. Because the very notion of a rule implies some degree of
generalization, Carter sometimes depicted the common law as avoiding
rules altogether.
It was difficult, however, for Carter to square his rule skepticism with
the common law doctrine of stare decisis. After all, the vast body of judi-
cial precedents set forth innumerable bottom-level rules that supposedly
provided an uncontroversial basis for resolving many cases. If a judge
hearing a matter found a prior case with essentially identical facts, stare
decisis ordinarily demanded that he decide the case at hand the same way.
Carter, a successful practitioner, recognized the power of precedent. In-
deed, at times, he discussed the role of precedent in a manner that made
him sound like a rule-bound formalist.
[A] large number of [judgments] declare that the particular transac-
tions described are like, or substantially like, some other transactions
which had previously engaged the attention of the courts and had
been decided in a particular way, and the like decision is therefore
made in the particular case under consideration; in other words, the
case is decided by an appeal to known precedent, or to known prece-
dents .... The operation ... of the tribunals has consisted simply in
scrutinising the features of the transactions and placing them in some
already determined class in which they belonged, the judgment pro-
nounced being nothing but the legal consequence of the fact that they
belonged to a particular class. 9 0
Carter acknowledged that the doctrine of stare decisis sometimes denied
common law judges the flexibility they needed to keep the law in line with
changing social norms. He maintained that legislation was warranted in
such situations.
[S]ociety in its progress and development outgrows its old usages and
essays to form new ones. The uniformity and persistency at which
189. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 31-32.
190. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 68-69.
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the judicial office always aims, become a barrier to this development;
and the need is felt of an agency less fettered by precedent and
clothed with a power somewhat resembling the creative function. It
is the office of legislation to supply this need. I9 I
Nevertheless, if Carter had adopted a stringent version of stare decisis,
he would have undermined his own primary argument for the superiority
of the common law over a code-namely, that the former, unlike the lat-
ter, was capable of resolving each case according to the dictates of justice.
The common law's embrace of binding precedent potentially made it just
as vulnerable as a code to the charge of sacrificing fairness for certainty.
Field and his allies frequently made precisely this assertion. Field pointed
out that "the Courts have not greater liberty to decide right without a code
than with it. The rules which govern the Judges in their decisions are con-
tained in precedents."' 92 To emphasize the contrast between the common
law and codification, Carter thus had to downplay the significance of stare
decisis.
Consequently, Carter whittled away the doctrine into insignificance.
First, he argued that the only relevant data emerging from a precedent
were the facts and the result.
The judge never undertakes to decide anything more than the precise
case brought before him for judgment. He considers the facts of that
case, and.., he pronounces judgment, and there stops. He does not
even declare, at least not as a necessary part of his function, what the
law is. He is not bound to write an opinion. He usually does write
one, stating his views upon the legal questions. But this is of no
binding force. The strictest doctrine of stare decisis requires subor-
dinate tribunals to follow, not the opinion, but the judgment; and the
obligation is of no force in a future case presenting materially differ-
ent aspects. If the court in its opinion lays down rules in general
terms which might embrace cases differing from the one decided,
such declaration of rules is provisional only, and subject to modifica-
tion in any future case presenting materially different features. 193
As Carter noted in the last sentence of this quotation, a common law
judge is not bound by a precedent if the case at hand presents facts "mate-
rially different" from the prior decision. The second critical feature of
Carter's effort to cabin stare decisis was his embrace of an extremely lib-
191. Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 44, at 232.
192. Letter from David Dudley Field to the California Bar, in I SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, supra note 122, at 354. Robert Fowler similarly
argued: "Another great objection to case-law is that the vast agglomeration of decisions tends to make
the law one of precedent and not one of principle; judges and lawyers are so overwhelmed and con-
founded by the array of authority that in desperation they shield themselves behind some ill-
considered precedent without regard to substantial justice in the given case. FOWLER, supra note 93,
at 49.
193. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 27.
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eral view of what constituted "material" distinctions. In his eyes, virtually
every case heard by a court was a "new" case. He recognized that the
"great mass of the transactions of life are... repetitions of what has be-
fore happened-not exact repetitions, for such never occur-but repeti-
tions of all substantial features."' 94 But such transactions rarely generated
legal disputes, because "they have once or oftener been subjected to judi-
cial scrutiny and the rules which govern them are [therefore] known.
They arise and pass away without engaging the attention of lawyers or the
courts."' 95 Those cases that reached a courtroom were, for the most part,
"exceptional" cases. 196 "The great bulk of ... litigation springs out of
transactions which present material features never before exhibited, or
new combinations and groupings of facts."' 97
Carter emphasized that the "infinite number of diversities" in human af-
fairs generated countless new questions of fairness. "In the State of New
York, each successive day witnesses acts, millions in number, each one of
which may, by possibility, become the source of dispute, and call for judi-
cial decision, and no two of them be alike!"' 98 And because society con-
stantly evolved, there would never be a shortage of fresh problems for
courts to address. Carter explained:
The notion that society ever has reached, or ever will reach, a state of
equilibrium and rest, so that the transactions of tomorrow will be
mere repetitions in substance of the transactions of to-day [sic] is a
vain illusion. There is no part of the universe which is not forever
under the dominion of change, and no where [sic] does it proceed
with such activity as in the realm of man.' 99
If virtually all cases heard by the courts exhibited novel material fea-
tures, the significance of stare decisis was limited indeed. Carter asserted
that a judge hoping to decide a case solely by reference to reported prece-
dents would almost always discover that "there is no rule truly 'known'
which governs it."2 ° The rules pronounced by judges in prior cases "are
to be taken in reference to the facts which have elicited the opinions...
and whenever a case arises presenting different aspects, the rule is subject
to modification and adaptation as justice or expediency may dictate."201
Carter viewed justice as so fact-specific that at times he seemed to chal-
lenge the very notion of framing legal rules in advance. He virtually
sneered at the "vast body of so-called rules found in our digests and trea-
194. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 35.
195. Id.
196. Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 44, at 227.
197. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 35.
198. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 36.
199. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 36.
200. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 29.
201. Id. at 25-26.
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tises and mentioned in the reports of decided cases.... None of them are
absolute. They are all provisional and subject to modification. 2 °2 He de-
clared:
The fact must always come before the law. Apart from known, exist-
ing facts, present to the mind of the judge.., he cannot even ask, and
still less answer, the question, what is the law? ... [P]rivate law does
not consist in a series of logical deductions drawn from original defi-
nitions and capable of existing independently of the material, or
moral world. 203
Carter pithily summed up his rule skepticism as follows: "[A]ll just
law... can have, in human apprehension, no existence apart from the
facts. 204
It bears repeating that Carter did not deny that judicial precedents were
relevant to common law decision making. They provided analogies and
helped guide the court's inquiry. In Carter's words, the judge's task was
"to apply the existing standard ofjustice to the new exhibition of fact, and
to do this by ascertaining the conclusion to which right reason, aided by
rules already established, leads."2 5 Carter's antiformalism lay in his con-
viction that precedents, though useful, did not ordinarily provide an indis-
putable rule of decision for the case at hand. He explained:
It is not that no rule is known which is applicable to the transaction;
there may be many which have a bearing on it. Several different
rules-all just in their proper sphere-are competing with each other
for supremacy. The question is not whether the rules are right or
wrong; they may all be right; but which must give way to the other;
or whether a modified and partial operation must not be given to all,
or some. It would be a fatal error to force upon such transactions a
rule which had arisen out of different ones. It would be sacrificing
justice for the sake of uniformity, whereas diversity is everywhere the
characteristic of justice.2 °6
This discussion anticipated, by almost half a century, legal realist Wal-
ter Wheeler Cook's well-known assertion that "legal principles-and rules
as well-are in the habit of hunting in pairs." 207
C. The Question of Certainty
Carter's depiction of the common law seemed to sacrifice certainty for
202. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 233.
203. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 28.
204. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 32.
205. Id. at 29-30.
206. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 35.
207. Walter Wheeler Cook, Book Review, 38 YALE L. J. 405, 406 (1929). For a further discus-
sion of this parallel, see infra text accompanying notes 284-286.
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the sake of fairness. This was a risky strategy, for the uncertainty of the
common law was one of the main themes of codification proponents. Ac-
cording to code advocates, this uncertainty was caused primarily by the
obscurity of common law reasoning and the uncontrolled proliferation of
precedents.2"8 Carter's contention that the fact-specific common law did
not establish clear rules in advance of actual disputes provided his oppo-
nents yet another basis for maintaining that the existing system was too
uncertain. Robert Fowler, for example, acknowledged that the common
law might more flexibly resolve problems raised by peculiar constellations
of facts, but he denied that codification "increases the proportion of injus-
tice in the given case ... to such an extent as to outweigh the benefits to
be derived from the added certainty and the compactness of expression
found in a code., 209
Carter did not view the issue of certainty as a vulnerability, however.
First, he argued that regardless of codification's effect on certainty, the
"necessity of enforcing justice in particular instances ... is imperative,
and can be subordinated to no other object. ' 210 Then he went further, at-
tacking the codifiers' premise that statutory law offered greater certainty
than the common law. Indeed, he confidently asserted that the common
law was more certain than a codified system.
Carter did not hold up the common law as an absolute guarantor of legal
certainty. Rather, he asserted that uncertainty was unavoidable in any le-
gal system because it "proceeds from causes quite beyond human con-
trol. 211 It was not "the fault of lawyers or judges, or of the system of our
jurisprudence" but rather "inherent in the order of nature. 212 Uncertainty
was inevitable because the endless emergence of unique factual circum-
stances constantly raised new ethical problems. "It should [be] remem-
bered, that the questions with which the law deals, and consequently the
law itself, are incessantly changing. Most of the uncertainty and doubt
does not arise in consequence of any failure to settle old questions, but
from the perpetual birth of new points of controversy. 213 Carter urged his
readers not only to acknowledge this uncertainty, but to embrace it.
Nor is this uncertainty to be deprecated. It is rather to be welcomed,
met, and surmounted. It is the discipline of human nature. It fur-
nishes the conditions upon which moral and intellectual progress are
made. "Progress is the child of struggle, and struggle is the child of
difficulty." What would become of science, reason, and morals, if
new problems were not incessantly presenting themselves for solu-
208. Morriss, supra note 2, at 369.
209. FOWLER, supra note 93, at 13.
210. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 36-37.
211. Id. at 114.
212. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 36-37.
213. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 114.
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tion. What progress would be possible in law, if justice could be fro-
zen into a rigid body of unchangeable rules? 214
Carter readily acknowledged that under the common law, the answer to
novel questions was sometimes unclear to the citizenry until judges, the
experts on the application of the social standard of justice, resolved them.
Nevertheless, the common law provided the people with a solid ground of
day-to-day certainty, because it was based on their own customary moral-
ity. They could conduct their affairs with "ordinary prudence... in the
full confidence that the rules of law which govern their transactions,
should they ever be challenged, would be the simple dictates of justice and
common sense intelligently ascertained and applied. 215
In a code system, by contrast, courts' decisions were based not on the
social standard of justice, but on the words of a statute. Carter argued,
first, that this approach engendered uncertainty because "human language
is, at best, so inaccurate an instrument, there being often numerous differ-
ent senses in which the same word is understood that there are, and always
will be, a multitude of doubts concerning the meaning of the best drawn
statutes." '216 An even more important cause of uncertainty in a code sys-
tem, according to Carter, was the irresistible tendency of law to conform
to the social standard of justice, even in the face of unambiguously con-
trary statutory language.
Whenever a statute is found to work injustice in consequence of the
failure of its framers to suitably provide for cases which they could
not foresee, an opposition arises against the operation of the law. If
the injustice be gross, the moral sense is shocked .... The courts re-
coil from the office of enforcing the law. Doubts are entertained
concerning the meaning of the statute. The plain sense of the words
is insisted upon by one side, the improbability that such injustice
could have been intended, by the other. The difficulty is usually re-
solved by the employment of the subtle arts of interpretation, and the
obvious meaning of the language is expounded away in the favor of
the interests of justice. Who does not know that of all the manifold
sources of uncertainty in law none is so fruitful as the attempt to ap-
ply a statute to a case falling within its terms, but which, not having
been foreseen by its framers, does not fall within its spirit?217
In short, Carter asserted that the common law's embodiment of custom-
ary morality did not make it less certain than a codified system. To the
contrary, the common law's reflection of the social standard of justice was
the very source of its superiority in this respect.
214. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 37.
215. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 37.
216. Id. at 83.
217. Id. at 37-38.
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D. Law Outside the Books
Carter's conviction that justice ("acceptability" in Thomas Grey's
terms) should be the ultimate determinant of every case required not only
that he relegate, and sometimes entirely reject, classical ideals such as
conceptualism and formalism, but also that he embrace a very un-
Langdellian view of the sources of law. Langdell asserted that "law is a
science, and.., all the available materials of that science are contained in
printed books."'21 8  For the Harvard dean, the common law decisions
stored in the law library were "the ultimate sources of all legal knowl-
edge."219 Carter, by contrast, did not believe that law could autonomously
generate a correct solution to every case. He thus recognized, at least by
the end of his career, that judges often had to look outside the law books.
Interestingly, Carter initially seemed to embrace what legal realist
Jerome Frank would later (in reference to Langdell) deride as "library
law., 220 Carter's early attitude may have been related to his role as the
first president of the Harvard Law School Association, the institution's
alumni organization. Langdell's innovative case method, premised on the
theory that the common law was a self-sufficient coherent system, was a
great point of pride for the school. 22' At the Association's first meeting,
in 1886, Carter delivered an address in which he praised the case method
and thus articulated a book-centered vision of law.
I think that the methods that are now pursued, so far as I understand
them, are a vast improvement over those with which I was acquainted
when I was a member of the School. What is it that students go to a
law school to learn? .. . What is this thing which we call "law," and
with the administration of which we have to deal? Where is it
found? ... It is found, and it is alone found, in those adjudications,
those judgments, which from time to time its ministers and its magis-
trates are called upon to make in determining the actual rights of
men.... The purpose of [the case method] is to study the great and
principal cases in which are the real sources of the law, and to extract
from them the rule which, when discovered, is found to be superior to
all cases. 222
How did Carter reconcile his assertion that law was found only in re-
ported cases with his belief that judges resolved cases according to the so-
218. Christopher Columbus Langdell, The Harvard Law School: Professor Langdell 's Oration, 3
L.Q. REV. 123, 124 (1887).
219. Id.
220. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907,908 (1933).
221. For Langdell's introduction of the case method and its influence at Harvard and other institu-
tions, see generally WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE (1994).
222. James Coolidge Carter, President's Address, in REPORT OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OF THE
FIRST GENERAL MEETING OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, AT CAMBRIDGE, NOVEMBER
5, 1886, at 26 (1887).
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cial standard of justice? Ultimately, he could not do so, but it took him a
while to recognize the tension. In The Provinces of the Written and the
Unwritten Law (1889), Carter maintained that by linking the law to the so-
cial standard of justice, he did "not, of course, mean to imply that the
judge ... makes any direct inquiry into public opinion." '223 He continued:
The fabric of the national law is a vast system of rules which are the
product of that opinion, gathered from time to time by the labors of
his predecessors, aided by the skill and learning of a numerous pro-
fessional body .... It is here that the social standard of justice stands
ascertained and declared; and the function of the judge is to apply it,
as it has been applied before, or, when new questions arise, to deter-
mine them according to the analogies which the system reveals to
him. 224
Even in this case-centered description of judicial decision making,
Carter acknowledged, if only indirectly, that the common law was not en-
tirely autonomous. After all, if judicial precedents reflected the social
standard of justice, principles external to "law in the books" must have en-
tered the common law system somehow. In Provinces, Carter suggested
that judicial decisions reflected the social standard of justice as an inevita-
ble consequence of the fact that judges were "in close intercourse and
sympathy with the mass of the people. ' '225 In other words, popular cus-
toms shaped the law even if judges looked only at case reports. Carter ex-
plained that the social standard of justice "is ascertained and made effec-
tive by the judges, who know it and feel it because they are part of the
community.
' 2 26
The next year, Carter started explicitly to back away from his sugges-
tion that the common law was simultaneously autonomous and a product
of the social standard of justice. In The Ideal and the Actual in the Law
(1890), as noted previously, Carter asserted that the "field of search" in
which judges looked for the law was "the habits, customs, business and
manners of the people, and those previously declared rules which have
sprung out of previous similar inquiries into habits, customs, business and
manner."'227  Carter now apparently recognized that judges purposively
examined not only law books, but also society itself.
Near the end of the final lecture of Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Func-
tion (1907), his posthumously-published book, Carter revisited the topic of
Harvard Law School's case method. This time, he qualified his praise of
the method in a way that illustrates how far he had traveled from Lang-
223. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 12-13.
224. Id. at 13.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 48.
227. Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 44, at 224.
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dell's "library law." Perhaps out of loyalty to his alma mater, which had
offered to host the (never-delivered) series of lectures the book comprised,
Carter acknowledged that Harvard's case method was the "correct" ap-
proach for teaching law students. But now, in stark contrast to his 1886
speech, and in terms that foreshadowed legal realism, he emphasized how
little a purely case-educated law school graduate really knew about law.
These volumes [of reported cases] ... are but a part of the great terri-
tory of fact which it is the business of the lawyer and jurist to ex-
plore. Life itself is a moving spectacle of numberless forms of con-
duct the study of which is necessary to the full equipment of the
lawyer or the judge.... Herein we find the reason why lawyers of
sound practical sense and knowledge of affairs so often acquit them-
selves both at the Bar and on the Bench better than others who may
be much more accomplished in the learning of books. They have
been studying diligently and to good purpose the facts of human con-
duct as they are displayed in the great book of life. The actual meth-
ods and systems of trade, commerce, and finance embrace great
realms of fact in which legal principles lie implicit and disclose
themselves to careful investigation. All the actions of men.. . are the
proper theme of the lawyer's study. And then too there is the internal
world, the realm of consciousness, equally necessary to be studied
and equally fruitful in results, for it is here that the secret springs, the
real causes of all conduct are discerned.228
Carter's critique of the case method echoes his assessment of Langdell
himself. In 1869, when Harvard president Charles Eliot was considering
appointing Langdell as the dean of the law school, he sought and received
Carter's opinion. Carter, who had known Langdell since they attended
college and law school together at Harvard, praised him as a "scholar of
the first order. '229 He then, however, remarked on Langdell's limited suc-
cess as a practitioner and ascribed it to Langdell's idealistic refusal to soil
himself with the muck of "the world as he found it."' 23° Carter observed
that "if [Langdell] is wanting in any of the qualities, which you are seek-
ing to secure, it will be found to be in aptitude of affairs and the skill and
resources to deal with society and men as he finds them. 231
Carter's portrait of Langdell as a detached intellectual, ill-suited for
practice, raises the question of whether Carter's own jurisprudence was
shaped in part by his long experience as a practicing lawyer. As I will dis-
cuss later in this Article,232 Carter's career as a litigator may have instilled
228. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 338-39.
229. Letter from James C. Carter to Charles W. Eliot, President, Harvard University (Dec. 20,
1869) (quoted in LAPIANA, supra note 221, at 12-13).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See infra Section VIII.
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in him an anticonceptualist and antiformalist outlook on law that under-
girded his jurisprudential arguments against the Civil Code. Interestingly,
the anticodification writings of other practicing attorneys show similar
qualities.
VII. THE ANTICLASSICAL APPROACH OF OTHER ANTICODIFICATION
WRITERS
Stephen Siegel, commenting on my earlier work on Carter, suggests that
Carter's location "outside the fold of classical legal thought" was "idio-
syncratic" in the Gilded Age.233 However, an examination of the writings
of contemporaneous anticodification writers demonstrates that Carter was
no maverick.
A. Albert Mathews
Albert Mathews was a lawyer who helped Carter organize the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York in 1869.234 In 1881 (two years be-
fore Carter wrote his first anticodification pamphlet), Mathews prepared
Thoughts on Codification of the Common Law, a tract that the ABCNY
printed and circulated as part of its campaign against Field's Civil Code.
In this piece, Mathews explored the sources and nature of the common law
in order to explain its superiority to a code system. In doing so, he, like
Carter, drew a picture of the common law in which conceptual order was
largely absent and formal reasoning was, at most, a minor feature.
Mathews placed justice at the center of his jurisprudence. He defined
the unwritten law (that is, the common law) as "the recognized will of [a]
community... based upon its notions of natural justice, good morals, and
good policy." '235 Mathews' chief argument against codification, like
Carter's, was that justice was too fact-specific to be embodied in generally
applicable rules. He, too, was concerned about the "single additional, or
omitted circumstance" that might make the application of a rule unfair in a
new case.
236
To attempt to create a code of laws out of abstract notions of jus-
tice.., would not be very likely to be successful. It might be com-
paratively easy to lay down a few simple abstract rules, but so soon
as the law-giver descended to particulars, in the absence of concrete
facts to guide his judgment, the laws of his imaginary empire would
be, necessarily, either tyrannical or abortive. It seems to be a task
233. Stephen A. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 631, 636 n.23 (2002) (dis-
cussing Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra note 3).
234. MARTIN, supra note 37, at 15.
235. ALBERT MATHEWS, THOUGHTS ON CODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW 9-10 (New York,
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 4th ed. 1887).
236. Id. at 16.
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beyond the wit of man to forsee [sic] what special cases may arise, or
thus to provide for contingencies that he cannot anticipate.2
37
Mathews, sounding strikingly like Carter, concluded that "when [a] rule is
to be found only in the Procrustean Bed of a written Code, the letter of the
statute must prevail over any fitting modification of that rule which un-
foreseen circumstances may come to require, and justice may be thus
surely defeated." '238
According to Mathews, the common law, in contrast to a codified sys-
tem, could resolve each matter fairly. It could "be adapted, by wise ad-
ministration, to the exigencies of particular cases of conflict as they
arise. '  Mathews' stress on the "plastic" nature of the common law im-
pelled him, like Carter, to narrow the doctrine of stare decisis into practi-
cal insignificance. He argued that each precedent was
necessarily limited to the precise concatenation of facts .... It is the
duty of a court of justice to ascertain and apply [the unwritten law] so
far only as respects the particular concrete combinations of facts
properly presented to it requires.... [I]t is no part of its province to
formulate general rules, or even principles, beyond what the particu-
lar case before it demands.24 °
Mathews' de-emphasis of the force of precedent also provided him with
a response to the codifiers' claim that the vast, unorganized body of com-
mon law cases was too burdensome for practicing lawyers. He was un-
troubled by the accumulation of precedents, he explained, because they
themselves did not constitute the law. "Cases are not principles; they are
only valuable as illustrations. If they are not beneficial no one is com-
pelled to use them; and, whoever wastes his time on them, may blame
none but himself.",241
Mathews vigorously rejected the notion that common law judges
"made" law. 242 He did not, however, devote much effort to explaining
where judges "found" the law, if they did not make it. Mathews did not
believe that courts decided cases through inexorable logical deduction; he
expressly denied that the common law was "an exact science. '"243 More-
over, he did not explicitly assert, as Carter would, that the "social standard
of justice" or "custom" provided the objectively correct answer for every
case. Ultimately, Mathews' answer to the code proponents' charges of
common law judicial lawmaking boiled down to a meek, "You, too." He
237. Id. at 13-14.
238. Id. at 16.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 15.
241. Id. at 22.
242. Id. at 23-26.
243. Id. at 21.
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argued, "Whether formulated by a Code, or illustrated by a precedent,
such rules must still be applied to cases as they arise, according to judicial
'notions of reason and justice. ' ' 244 Mathews would leave it to Carter to
construct a detailed theory as to how common law decision making could
be both nondiscretionary and invariably fair.
B. R. Floyd Clarke
In 1898, another New York practitioner, R. Floyd Clarke, published a
lengthy book titled The Science of Law and Lawmaking. This volume,
written for laymen, was, in essence, an extended jurisprudential attack on
codification. 245
Like Carter, Clarke maintained that justice should be the central value
of law. He contended that law "involves politics, political economy, and
ethics." '246 Clarke also echoed Carter's argument that codification would
undermine the law's moral basis. He described code decision making as a
process of deductive reasoning, from general rules to specific facts. He
explained:
Under the Code System the rule prescribed deals with something
which is never found in actual life. The Code rule deals with a cer-
tain combination of facts which never occurs solely, or alone, in the
outside world. The Code rule deals, therefore, with an abstraction of
the human mind, and not with the facts as they exist.247
The problem with this type of reasoning, for Clarke as for Carter, was that
it inevitably led to unjust decisions. "Where ... questions of equity or in-
equity arise, dependent upon different combinations of fact, it is not al-
ways easy to lay down beforehand a rule which will produce a correct de-
cision of all the possible cases that may arise. 248
Clarke asserted that common law decision-making "attempts to arrive at
a fair and just result in the particular case.,"249 He contrasted the wholly
inductive approach of the common law with the deductive reasoning that
characterized a codified system .25° "The first and most important investi-
gation [of the common law judge] is into the facts of the particular case-
facts which have already happened and are now presented for observation
244. Id. at 25.
245. R. FLOYD CLARKE, THE SCIENCE OF LAW AND LAWMAKING: BEING AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW, A GENERAL VIEW OF ITS FORMS AND SUBSTANCE, AND A DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF
CODIFICATION (1898). It is unclear why Clarke published such a book when he did, more than a dec-
ade after Field's effort to codify New York's private law had gasped its final breath in the state legisla-
ture.
246. Id. at 24.
247. Id. at 255.
248. Id. at 25.
249. Id. at 239.
250. Id. at 238. Induction describes reasoning from the particular to the general; deduction de-
scribes reasoning from the general to the particular.
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and decision. Given the facts, the attempt is made to decide the case so
that justice will result." ' 1 In classicist common law methodology, the in-
duction of general principles from specific cases was followed by the de-
ductive derivation of the rule for the case at hand. Clarke, by contrast, ex-
cluded deduction from the common law process altogether. He
acknowledged that the common law judicial method often seemed deduc-
tive on the surface, because the court invoked previously established gen-
eral principles. But he continued:
Even in these instances, however, the true inductive nature of a
common law decision is manifest; for the selection of the general rule
which shall be applied to the facts of the given case is not dependent
on a hard and fast interpretation of the language in which such gen-
eral truth has been expressed, as including or not including the case
in question, but rather upon a process of classing the individual case
by its facts with cases of like combinations of fact, and so bringing it
under a general principle which, when applied to the facts, will pro-
duce substantial justice. 252
For Clarke, as for Carter, the driving principle behind every common
law decision was "Let justice be done in this case." '253 And, as Ezra
Thayer pointed out in criticizing Carter, this principle cannot be the basis
for a coherent system of logically derived rules. Indeed, Clarke explicitly
downplayed the benefits of "formal organization." He acknowledged that
codes were superior to the common law in this respect, but he continued:
The advantage to be derived from scientific excellence in this particu-
lar may, however, be obtained at too great a cost.
For it must ever be borne in mind that the phenomena a system of
justice deals with, are the special disputes among men; not the ab-
stract conceptions of general principles. The excellence of a system
depends upon whether, in effect, justice is done between man and
man. 254
Clarke, a notably mediocre thinker, tried awkwardly to impose an al-
most Langdellian language of logic over his justice-centered vision of the
common law. Nevertheless, despite his muddled talk of induction and de-
duction, of rules and principles, Clarke ultimately manifested little con-
cern for either conceptual order or formality. For him, as for Carter, these
values were subsidiary to achieving an acceptable decision in each case.
Clarke made this point clear in summarizing the common law method of
judging:
251. Id. at 249.
252. Id. at 250.
253. Id. at 240.
254. Id. at 309-10.
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The great mass of existing rules and exceptions established by de-
cided cases, and apparently affecting the decision to be made, are
sifted and explained, limited and followed, with a view, upon the
principles of logic, equity and political economy applicable, to make
those apply which will produce the desired just result in the case at
hand.255
Whereas Carter clung to the notion that common law decisions were
nondiscretionary because judges derived them from a homogeneous social
standard of justice, Clarke, writing two years before the turn of the cen-
tury, took the modernist step of portraying the common law as almost en-
tirely untethered. He bluntly spoke of judges "creating" legal rules 256 and
freely described the common law as "judge-made law.' ' 257  Despite this
difference, however, the two lawyers fully agreed that the common law's
goal was case-specific justice and that conceptual order and formal reason-
ing played only a minimal role in common law decision making.
VIII. PRACTITIONERS' JURISPRUDENCE?
The codification debate, more than any other issue of the late nineteenth
century, forced practicing lawyers to grapple publicly with large jurispru-
dential questions. The struggle against codification thus inspired an ex-
traordinary flowering of literature in which attorneys defending the com-
mon law, such as Carter, Mathews, and Clarke, thoughtfully examined
their role, and that of judges, in the existing legal system. 258 The vision of
the common law they articulated in these writings was probably shaped in
part by their experience as practitioners.
Because litigators tend to focus on the facts of particular cases and on
the flexibility of legal rules, they may have been particularly inclined to
reject the conceptual formalism embodied by both complete codification
and Langdellian classicism. Perhaps the daily representation of clients in
actual matters led Carter and other practitioners to focus on fine factual
distinctions more than on abstract principles. In a speech to graduating
law students at Columbian University (now George Washington Univer-
sity), Carter offered advice on "how to direct your attention when you
255. Id. at 239.
256. See, e.g., id. at 238.
257. See, e.g., id. at 98, 238.
258. For other illustrations of this literature, see, for example, DANIEL H. CHAMBERLAIN,
UNANSWERABLE OBJECTIONS TO CODIFICATION (n.p., n.d.); WILLIAM B. HORNBLOWER, IS
CODIFICATION OF THE LAW EXPEDIENT? (n.p., 1888); THE ARGUMENTS OF THE HONORABLE
WILLLIAM D. SHIPMAN AND FREDERIC R. COUDERT, ESQUIRE, BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Worcester, Mass., Press of Chas. Hamilton 1881); JOHN
R. STRONG, A MEMORANDUM UPON THE PROPOSED "CIVIL CODE" (New York, Henry Bessey, Printer
1884); Thomas Thacher, The Law's Uncertainty, 23 J. SOC. SCI. 125 (1887).
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come to engage in the practical work of the lawyer., 25 9 He told the stu-
dents:
Inasmuch as your science consists in the observation of facts with
which it deals, and those facts are the transactions of men, you cannot
study them too closely. You will often find, what every practicing
lawyer has found, that much of the difficulty and uncertainty you
meet with in the study of any particular case does not come, as one is
apt to think, from ignorance of the law, but from a too hasty and in-
sufficient observation of the facts .... It has often happened to me
that clients would come to me with cases in respect to which they
would have an undoubting conviction that the right was on their side,
an opinion I was not able at first to confirm, but, upon subsequent re-
flection, I would become converted to their views. The reason was
that I would be thinking upon the abstract rules of law instead of
closely studying the facts, while they, living and moving in the facts
and in the customs and usages which men observe, really possessed
views of the law clearer and juster than my own.2 60
Carter's practice experience may also have instilled in him a belief in
the contingency and manipulability of legal reasoning. In the same
speech, Carter remarked:
The lawyer is not charged in any case with the duty of finally deter-
mining which side is right, but of finding grounds and reasons for de-
fending the side upon which he is retained.... Lawsuits are not con-
flicts in which all arguments upon the one side are right and upon the
other wrong; they are conflicts between rival and competing rules and
principles, all of which are true within certain limits but some of
which must give way to the superior force of others.2 61
Although Carter never abandoned his conviction that there was, in fact, a
correct answer to every case, he attributed the law's determinacy not to the
legal reasoning process, but to the social standard of justice on which the
law was based.
Even though Carter took obvious pride in his own erudition, there is an
anti-intellectual undercurrent to his writing, directed at those who devoted
their lives entirely to affairs of the mind. He described supporters of codi-
fication in dismissive terms similar to those he used to characterize Lang-
dell. Jeremy Bentham was "a man of pre-eminent intellectual ability, but
not an experienced lawyer, or a safe guide upon any subject." '262 The
codifiers' calls for more systematic order were "the views of professors of
259. JAMES C. CARTER, HINTS TO YOUNG LAWYERS: ADDRESS OF JAMES C. CARTER, LL D., TO
THE GRADUATING CLASS OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE COLUMBIAN UNIVERSITY AT THE COMMENCE-
MENT HELD JUNE 12, 1894, at 9 (Washington, D.C., Columbian University Press 1894).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 12.
262. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 70.
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law, whose lives are devoted, not like those of lawyers and judges, to the
practical administration of law, but to teaching it, and lecturing about
it.,263
Clarke, like Carter, suggested that his anticodification stance, and his
anticonceptualism generally, derived from insight he acquired as a practic-
ing lawyer.
No amount of theory is equivalent to actual practice; and in general-
izing on a subject without actual contact with the things themselves,
we are apt to lose sight of facts, and be misled by false analogies. In
reading the theoretical jurists, a practical lawyer receives the impres-
sion that had Bentham, Austin, and some others, ever taken an active
part in the actual practice of law ... they would have preferred as a
practical guide the incoherent mass of material preserved in our
common law reports to the most scientific code that the human mind
could possible produce.
The philosopher in his closet, viewing all things by the dry light of
generalization, naturally loses sight of the individual cases, and the
difficulties inherent in their true solution. His only problem is to
generalize these cases into some order and coherence....
The practitioner, on the other hand, looks only at the problem of the
special case presented. His difficulty is to find light to guide him to a
correct decision of the case in hand....
This is not to say that Gilded Age practitioners unanimously opposed
codification. After all, David Dudley Field himself was an active attorney.
Moreover, at its 1886 annual meeting, the American Bar Association, by a
vote of 58 to 41, adopted the following resolution offered by Field: "The
law itself should be reduced, so far as its substantive principles are settled,
to the form of a statute., 265
Nevertheless, in considering the attitudes of practicing lawyers toward
codification, it is important to define carefully what is meant by the term
codification. Clarke, like Carter, railed against a complete code that "pro-
fesses to, and is intended to, state all the rules that may be applicable to
that province of the law of which it is a Code. 2 66 The lawyers attending
the 1886 ABA meeting were not opining on such an instrument. Field, in
his comments preceding the vote, emphasized the limited significance of
his resolution. He stressed that a vote for the resolution did not represent
support for general codification, but merely for the position that principles
263. Id. at 72.
264. CLARKE, supra note 245, at 100.
265. REP. NINTH ANN. MEETING A.B.A., supra note 107, at 74.
266. CLARKE, supra note 245, at 97.
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of law should be stated in statutory form when it was feasible to do so. 2 6 7
And although he remarked that he personally supported the adoption of a
code, he emphasized that he did "not mean by it a book which shall con-
tain within its covers all the rules of law which are to govern all the trans-
actions of men in all future time. 268 In short, the ABA's approval of
Field's resolution cannot be interpreted as anything like an endorsement of
European-style complete codification.
Supporters of codification viewed the practicing bar not only as a barrier
to enacting a code, but also as a primary cause of the legal uncertainty and
disorder they were striving to alleviate in the first place. The Albany Law
Journal, in an article supporting codification, thus asserted that lawyers
should not be involved in drafting the code. The article maintained that
the practicing lawyer
has been, as it were, counting the bricks in every case he argued be-
fore a bench or jury, instead of considering the philosophy and higher
analogies of the legal principles involved.... Arguments of particu-
lar points, even of law and not of fact, are arguments on facts, and not
on the expansiveness of laws or of their natural relations to one an-
other, but only on their relation to facts .... The facts in each case
admit of no deduction. It is only the law involved in these facts that
admits of such ratiocinative development .... [The practicing law-
yer's] functions.., savor too much of the concrete to foster a phi-
losophic spirit .... His eloquence, poetry, imagination, rhetoric and
philosophy, all have a point that are [sic] fit only for lodgment in
earth, and not for the broad basis of philosophical structures.269
Although practicing lawyers do not usually think of themselves as juris-
prudential thinkers, they inevitably develop jurisprudential notions. They
do not frequently articulate these broad legal theories, even to themselves.
At times, however, a controversy arises in the world of legal practice that
requires members of the bar systematically to analyze the overall nature of
the system within which they work. The codification dispute of the late
nineteenth century was such a moment. And the resulting portrait of the
common law painted by these lawyer-jurists was resoundingly different
from that offered by Christopher Columbus Langdell. Instead, the anti-
codifiers' vision of the common law foreshadowed, by several decades,
the views of the aggressively anti-Langdellian legal realists.
IX. CARTER AND LEGAL REALISM
After World War I, the assault on legal classicism in general, and on
267. REP. NINTH ANN. MEETING A.B.A., supra note 107, at 66, 68.
268. Id. at 68.
269. The Civil Code of the State of New York-No. Ill, Relations of Judge-Made Law to a Code, 2
ALB. L.J. 450-51 (1870).
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Langdell in particular, was advanced by a group of scholars commonly
known as the legal realists. 270  The realists, who were particularly domi-
nant at Yale and Columbia Law Schools, played a critical role in shaping
legal academic discourse during the 1920s and 1930s. 271  Although the re-
alists largely ignored Carter in their own writings, there were striking
similarities between his jurisprudence and theirs. The question of why the
realists neglected Carter is an interesting and complex one that I have ex-
amined elsewhere.272 Here, I will limit my discussion to the ways in
which Carter prefigured legal realism, regardless of the extent of influence
he had over it.
A. Antiformalist Legal Reasoning
Consider, for example, Carter's and the realists' respective views on the
significance of legal rules. The realists insisted on the indeterminacy of
common-law rules, at least in those cases where the law was unclear
enough to warrant litigation and appeal.273 If the realists had paid atten-
tion to Carter, they would have realized that his work anticipated their
own in this respect. As explored above, a visceral resistance to generaliza-
tion lay at the core of Carter's jurisprudence. In his view, the application
of general rules to concrete cases "does not embody justice; it is a mere
jump in the dark; it is a violent framing of rules without reference to jus-
tice. '274 The fact that common law judges did not decide cases through
the deductive application of rules was, Carter argued, the basis for the
common law's superiority to codified systems.
Like Carter, the realists thought that deduction from general concepts
and rules was an unwise and unjust method of decision making. Laura
Kalman explains: "The realists did not place their faith in the rules and
concepts the conceptualists derived. For these were formed by classifying
270. See Kimball, The Langdell Problem, supra note 13, at 303-11 (discussing the realists' por-
trait of Langdell). Karl Llewellyn, in 1925, was apparently the first to characterize this strand of legal
thought as "realistic jurisprudence." See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN:
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 144 (1997).
271. As Morton Horwitz has pointed out, "[D]efining Legal Realism with precision is not all that
easy." HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 169. The term legal realist has most commonly been applied to
antiformalist law professors, especially those with a social-scientific orientation, during the 1920s and
1930s. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986); JOHN HENRY
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995). Morton Horwitz
urges that the definition be expanded to include earlier critical thinkers (including Pound and Holmes),
sophisticated doctrinal writers, administrative law scholars, and various scholars in related non-law
disciplines. HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 182-85. For purposes of this discussion, I use the term legal
realist in the prior, more limited sense.
272. Grossman, The Ideal and the Actual of James Coolidge Carter, supra note 37, at 389-97.
273. See WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 48-106 (1968). Rumble observes that although a few realists were almost entirely
nihilistic with regard to legal rules, the majority limited their rule skepticism to the application of rules
in contested cases. Id. at 96-97.
274. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 33.
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disparate fact situations under the same rubric, and an opposition to the
search for unity implicit in conceptualistic abstractions lay at the core of
Legal Realism." '275 Karl Llewellyn, a leading realist, declared that one
central aspect of the realist creed was the "belief in the worthwhileness of
grouping cases and legal situations into narrower categories than has been
the practice in the past. This is connected with the distrust of verbally
simple rules-which so often cover dissimilar and non-simple fact situa-
tions.
The realists' attitude toward the doctrine of stare decisis echoed Carter's
and reflected their similar fact-specific approach to legal reasoning. As
discussed above, Carter minimized the force of stare decisis in two ways:
(1) by contending that the only relevant data contained in a precedent were
the facts and the result, and (2) by claiming that most cases that reached
litigation presented the court with materially distinguishable facts. 277 Le-
gal realist Herman Oliphant tried to cabin precedent in an almost equiva-
lent manner. In A Return to Stare Decisis, he argued that the only aspect
of precedents that was "susceptible of sound and satisfying study" was
"what courts have done in response to the stimuli of the facts of the con-
crete cases before them., 278  He observed that a precedent could be
deemed to govern a very narrow range of fact situations, a very broad
range, or any gradation between, depending on how tightly it was tied to
its particular circumstances. Like Carter, Oliphant wanted jurists to lean
toward the pole of factual precision and thus to avoid excessive generali-
zation in the application of precedents.279
Oliphant perceived a lamentable historical trend in the opposite direc-
tion.280 Interestingly, however, he did not contend that the embrace of ab-
straction actually impelled courts to make unfair decisions. Like Carter,
he believed that common law judges, regardless of legal formalities,
tended to resolve cases in accordance with their sense of justice.
Judges are men, and men respond to human situations. When the
facts stimulating them to the action taken are studied from a particu-
lar and a current point of view, which our present classification pre-
vents, we acquire a new faith in stare decisis. From this viewpoint
we see that courts are dominantly coerced, not by the essays of their
predecessors, but by a surer thing, by an intuition of fitness of solu-
275. KALMAN, supra note 271, at 22.
276. Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 1222, 1237 (1931).
277. See supra Section VI.B.
278. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 6 AM. L. SCH. REv. 215, 225 (1928).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 220-22. He remarked, "While the law was thus grouping the transactions of life into
larger and larger piles, held together by common attributes more and more accidental, life rolled on,
always concrete, always specific, but becoming more and more diversified with ominous speed." Id.
at 221.
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tion to problem, and a renewed confidence in judicial government is
engendered.281
Oliphant's ultimate goal was not to prevent general propositions from
deciding concrete cases, for, in his mind, courts rarely actually resolved
matters in this way. His true aim was to convince judges to embrace a
"conscious and methodological empiricism" that would help them accom-
plish their practical ends. 282
Other realists had a similarly limited view of the importance of stare de-
cisis. Llewellyn, for example, sounded quite like Carter when he ex-
pressed skepticism about the "rules" created by judicial precedents.
Every case lays down a rule, the rule of the case. The express ratio
decidendi is prima facie the rule of the case, since it is the group upon
which the court chose to rest its decision. But a later court can reex-
amine the case and can invoke the canon that no judge has power to
decide what is not before him, can, through examination of the facts
or the procedural issue, narrow the picture of what was actually be-
fore the court and can hold that the ruling made requires to be under-
stood as thus restricted. In the extreme form this results in what is
known as expressly "confining the case to its particular facts." This
rule holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars.283
Realists stressed not only the manipulability of the process by which
courts drew rules from precedents, but also the indeterminacy of the proc-
ess by which judges deductively applied these rules to new facts. Realist
literature emphasized the point that more than one rule was frequently
available for the same fact situation. Oliphant, for example, asserted,
"The choice between the legal principles competing to control the new
human situations involved in the cases we pass upon is not dictated by
logic." '284 Llewellyn similarly argued that "in any case doubtful enough to
make litigation respectable the available authoritative premises-i.e.,
premises legitimate and impeccable under the traditional legal tech-
niques-are at least two, and ... the two are mutually contradictory as ap-
plied to the case at hand." '285 Most memorably, Walter Wheeler Cook de-
clared: "Legal principles-and rules as well-are in the habit of hunting in
pairs. 286
281. Id. at 225-26.
282. Id. at 228.
283. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 72 (Oceana Pub-
lications 1960) (1930). Llewellyn also emphasized how judges often used a "loose view" of precedent
to take advantage of prior rulings that supported the result they were trying to reach. Id. at 74. The
combination of these two techniques made it "possible to void the past mistakes of courts, and yet to
make use of every happy insight for which a judge in writing may have found expression." Id. at 75.
284. Oliphant, supra note 278, at 228.
285. Llewellyn, supra note 276, at 1239.
286. Cook, supra note 207, at 406.
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In modem scholarship, the realists of the 1920s and the 1930s receive
most of the credit for developing these assaults on the logical pretensions
of the classicists. As described in this Article, however, anticodifiers like
Carter, Mathews, and Clarke displayed similar rule skepticism several
decades earlier. Indeed, in 1889, Carter used language almost identical to
that of Oliphant, Llewellyn, and Cook to describe the common law
method for deciding new cases: "It is not that no rule is known which is
applicable to the transaction; there may be many which have a bearing on
it. Several different rules-all just in their proper sphere-are competing
with each other for supremacy. 287
B. Custom
The oft-repeated adage that the legal realists believed "the law is deter-
mined by what the judge had for breakfast" is an absurd caricature.288 The
realists did not think court decisions were simply arbitrary. After all, they
viewed the legal scholar's role as largely a predictive one, and the very
possibility of prediction implies some degree of order and regularity. The
realists unanimously agreed, however, that formal rules and logical rea-
soning did not dictate legal results. They therefore sought to identify ex-
planations external to the law itself for judicial decisions.289 One of these
explanations was custom. Modem scholars disagree on just how central
the notion of custom was to the realist jurisprudence of the 1920s and
1930s. 29° It seems fair to state, however, that anticlassicist legal thinkers
of that era were generally interested in the relationship between law and
custom, broadly conceived.
Moreover, there was a particular strand of realism that focused inten-
sively on custom, in a way strikingly reminiscent of Carter. The preferred
287. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 35.
288. At least one scholar has attempted, unsuccessfully, to trace the origins of this saying. See
Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 236
n. 16 (1990).
289. Llewellyn, in his 1931 description and defense of the Legal Realism movement, stated that
the realists agreed "there is less possibility of accurate prediction of what courts will do than the tradi-
tional rules would lead us to suppose (and what possibility there is must be found in good measure
outside these same traditional rules)." But he adamantly denied that the realists embraced uncertainty.
He explained, "The immediate result of the preliminary work thus far described has been a further,
varied series of endeavors; the focussing [sic] of conscious attack on discovering the factors thus far
unpredictable, in good part with a view to their control." Llewellyn, supra note 276, at 1241-42.
290. Compare Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 503
(1996) (book review) (The realists saw adjudication as "intuitive dispute resolution in light of uncon-
sciously absorbed custom."), and AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 233 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds.,
1993) ("While most Realists debunked the notion of legal doctrine working independently as a motive
force in social life, it was only extremists among them such as Underhill Moore who considered that
legal rules were wholly determined by custom or culture, having no gravitational power of their
own."), with G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and So-
cial Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1015 (1972) (The realists' view
of human behavior as idiosyncratic "was subversive of collective behavior standards based on external
phenomena .... ).
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term among these realists, however, was not custom, but mores. This
word choice reflected the impact of William Graham Sumner (1840-
1910), a tremendously popular and influential Professor of Political and
Social Science at Yale. 291 Sumner's most widely-read work, Folkways: A
Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mo-
res, and Morals (1906), introduced the term mores into the everyday vo-
cabulary of American academia.292 Sumner used the word folkways gen-
erally to refer to all naturally evolving, unconsciously followed patterns of
behavior within a group.293 Those folkways with the most directive force
over society were, according to Sumner, mores, which he defined as
"folkways with the connotations of right and truth in respect to welfare,
embodied in them." '294 Mores were folkways "raised to a different plane,"
because they were "capable of producing inferences, developing into new
forms, and extending their constructive influence over men and soci-
ety."' 95 Sumner contended that all laws, indeed all societal institutions,
were "produced out of mores."'2 96 Similarly to Carter, he asserted, "Legis-
lation ... has to seek standing ground on the existing mores, and it soon
becomes apparent that legislation, to be strong, must be consistent with the
mores." 297  Despite the obvious parallels between Sumner's work and
Carter's, there is no evidence that either scholar directly influenced the
other. 298
Sumner's impact on legal scholarship became evident in the 191 Os, par-
ticularly in the pages of the Yale Law Journal, which printed a number of
pieces discussing the relationship between mores and law. In 1917, for
example, the Journal published The Dead Hand of the Common Law, by
Yale Law School Professor and legal realist Arthur Corbin. In this piece,
Corbin drew on Sumner's analysis of mores, and perhaps also on Carter's
work, to praise common law decision making.
291. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 53, 55 (1955);
HARRIS E. STARR, WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 373-82 (1925); Grossman, The Ideal and the Actual of
James Coolidge Carter, supra note 37, at 376-77.
292. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF
USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS (Ginn & Co. 1940) (1906).
293. Id. at 2-3.
294. Id. at 38.
295. Id. at 30.
296. Id. at 53. For Sumner's discussion of the relationship between mores and law, see id. at 53-
57.
297. Id. at 55.
298. Sumner almost certainly cannot have inspired Carter, for Folkways, the first piece in which
Sumner articulated his theories in a manner similar to Carter, was not published until the year after
Carter's death. It also seems unlikely that Carter's work inspired Sumner; Folkways does not include
a single citation to Carter's work. M.J. Aronson ascribed the similarity between the ideas of Carter
and Sumner to the fact that each represented "the culmination of a current of thought which permeated
the intellectual life of the last quarter of the nineteenth century"-the "naturalistic evolutionism" of
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. M.J. Aronson, The Juridicial Evolutionism of James Coolidge
Carter, 10 U. TORONTO L. J. 1, 1 (1953).
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A very large part of legislation must always be ex post facto and it is
this sort of judicial legislation [common law decision making] that
gives satisfaction. In spite of occasional outcry, it works. It may
sometimes be difficult to decide a concrete case after it has occurred,
but it is far easier than to decide it in advance in the form of a general
rule. By this process we get better law, law more nearly in harmony
with prevailing custom and desire and with the justice of the present
day. A litigant is less likely to be surprised and pained by a decision
based upon rules thus established than he is by decisions based on
statutes. Judicial rules, in new cases as well as in old cases, are
drawn from the mores of society as the judges know them; and they
are stated anew in each case with specific reference to a case the facts
of which are historically complete. The litigant will not be greatly
surprised at the mores, because his daily life is ordered by them and
he has helped, generally unconsciously, to make them.299
The subsequent volume of the Yale Law Journal included an article by
Sumner's disciple, A.G. Keller, analyzing how law "is a sort of crystalli-
zation of the mores. 3 °°
Sumner's influence on the legal academy became especially manifest in
1919, when the editors of the Yale Law Journal placed an unsigned note
titled "Social Mores, Legal Analysis, and the Journal" at the start of an is-
sue. In this note, the editors remarked that the Journal, under the inspira-
tion of the late Yale Law School Professor Wesley Hohfeld, had recently
been concentrating on the classification of legal concepts and on "the ne-
cessity of a more exact terminology leading to a more accurate legal
analysis."3 1 Now was the time, the editors suggested, to shift the Jour-
nal's attention to another critical matter: the fact that "law forms but a part
of our ever-changing social mores, and that it is the function of lawyers, of
jurists, and of law schools to cause the statement and the application of our
legal rules to be in harmony with the mores of the present instead of those
of an outgrown past."3 2 The editors acknowledged that Hohfeld's con-
ceptions were indispensable to the creation of any restatement or reclassi-
fication of the law, but they continued:
[W]e must realize and confess that no restatement or classification is
final. If our ancestors supposed 'justice' to be eternal and 'law' to be
a series of unchangeable a priori rules from which decisions of all
special cases could be deduced, so also they supposed the world to be
299. Arthur L. Corbin, The Dead Hand of the Common Law, 27 YALE L.J. 668, 672 (1918).
300. A.G. Keller, Law in Evolution, 28 YALE L.J. 769, 775 (1919); see also Arthur L. Corbin,
Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 YALE L.J. 739 (1919) (examining the effect of mores); John E.
Young, The Law as and Expression of Community Ideals and the Lawmaking Functions of the Courts,
27 YALE L.J. 1 (1917).
301. Social Mores, Legal Analysis, and the Journal, 29 YALE L.J. 83, 84 (1919).
302. Id. at 83-84. It is unclear why the editors did not acknowledge the recent articles in the
Journal, discussed above, concerning law and mores.
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flat and to be the fixed center about which the firmament revolved.303
The Journal's editors thus considered an examination of the relationship
between law and mores to be a necessary counterbalance to conceptual-
ism, even Hohfeld's sophisticated (and arguably subversive) version of
conceptualism. 3" The note, quoting Sumner, continued:
[H]istory affords the perspective in which we can observe that "law"
changes with the mores of the community and that "the mores can
make anything right." No ingenious arrangement of fundamental le-
gal concepts, no mere machinery or terminology, however exact, can
determine for us what the existing law is or what we shall make it for
the future. That will be determined, now as in the past, by the vary-
ing feelings and customs and desires and needs of men. Hence those
who state or who administer the law must be wise to the mores of
their own times, must keep perpetually up to date.3 °5
The editors closed the note by soliciting submissions "making use of the
new analysis and showing an understanding of the connection of the mo-
res and the law, the mores of marriage and the family, the mores of pro-
duction and business, the mores of organized human society."3 °6
Although the topic of mores can hardly be said to have dominated the
Yale Law Journal in the years following this call for papers, its pages (as
well as those of other law reviews) were peppered with references to mo-
res, folkways, Sumner, and Keller during the 1920s and 1930s. 3 °7
Throughout this period, Corbin remained the leading voice in the legal
academy on the subject of mores. He played an instrumental role in train-
ing, hiring, nurturing, and inspiring the second generation of realists, and
the concept of mores thus inevitably influenced their jurisprudence.30 8
Corbin, by his own admission, did not attempt to support his assertions
with empirical data. 30 9 By contrast, the later realists strove to support their
claims about custom and law with varying degrees of investigational rigor.
Corbin sounded more like Carter than did any other realist precisely be-
cause of the general and nonempirical quality of his statements about the
relationship between mores and law.
303. Id. at 85.
304. For a discussion of Hohfeld's relationship to progressive legal thought, see HORWITZ, supra
note 7, at 151-56.
305. Social Mores, supra note 301, at 85.
306. Id. The editors' note cited Carter's Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function, but only for a
point regarding the supposed ex post facto quality ofjudicial decision making. Id. at 85, n.5.
307. I confirmed this point by using the database HeinOnline to perform a search of these terms in
the Yale Law Journal and other legal periodicals.
308. For a discussion of Corbin's role in building Yale into the premier realist law school, see
KALMAN, supra note 271, at 98-107. Kalman repeatedly refers to "first generation realists" and "sec-
ond generation realists."
309. Arthur L. Corbin, Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 449, 472
(1937).
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Nevertheless, discussions of custom evocative of Sumner's and Carter's
work can also be found in the writing of the second-generation realists.
For example, Max Radin observed:
The court can select the precedents or the interpretation of a statute
which will lead to a result in accordance with the manners and cus-
toms of the people, and the court very commonly does so.... And it
must not be forgotten that judges also are people and, to a consider-
able extent, the court's own feeling of justice is adequately met if its
decisions create a situation in accord with the manners and customs
of the people.31°
Karl Llewellyn asserted that "law observance is a question not of legal
rules, but of the formation of folkways that can be and will be learned
chiefly without direct reference to particular rules." '311 He described how
the realists studied the "set-up of men's ways and practices and ideas on
the subject matter of the controversy .... in the hope that this might yield
a further or even final basis for prediction." '312 Llewellyn included, in this
type of scholarship, not only the painstaking empirical studies of societal
practices by his contemporaries, but also the "more or less indefinite refer-
ence to custom [by] the historical school." '313
The realists' approach to custom was less simplistic than Carter's. Lle-
wellyn, for example, criticized "the vast vagueness of Carter's picture,"
pointing to his failure adequately to address the "multiformity and conflict
of subgroup 'customs,"' and situations in which officials created law in
the absence of custom, or even in contradiction to it.314 Nonetheless, the
realists' parallel turn to custom reflected a similar impulse to identify ob-
jective, "scientific" bases for judicial decisions apart from formalistic legal
reasoning. Both Carter and the realists portrayed the study of law as an
empirical, value-free enterprise. Llewellyn famously declared that a
common characteristic of realist scholarship was "the temporary divorce
of Is and Ought for purposes of study.... This involves during the study
of what courts are doing the effort to disregard the question what they
ought to do." '3 15 Carter had used almost exactly the same language a quar-
310. MAx RADIN, THE LAW AND MR. SMITH 34 (1938); see also Max Radin, The Theory of Judi-
cial Decisions: Or How Judges Think, I A.B.A. J. 357, 362 (1925) ("We need not fear arbitrariness.
Our Cokes and Mansfields and Eldons derive their physical and spiritual nourishment from the same
sources that we do. They will find good what we find good, if we will let them.").
311. Karl N. Llewellyn, Law Observance Versus Law Enforcement, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 399 (1962). Llewellyn originally delivered this address in 1928.
312. Llewellyn, supra note 276, at 1244.
313. Id.
314. Karl N. Llewellyn, Carter, James Coolidge, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
243, 244 (1931).
315. Llewellyn, supra note 276, at 1236. For the leading account of the battle between the realists
and their critics over the question of ethics and values, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 159-78 (1973). Morton Horwitz argues that historians, by narrowly defining
the Legal Realist movement to include primarily social-science-oriented scholars of the 1920s and
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ter century earlier: "I have sought to discover those rules only which actu-
ally regulate conduct, not those which ought to regulate it. Science asks
primarily only what is, not what ought to be." 316
C. Practitioner's Outlook
The realists also shared Carter's practitioner's mentality. Although the
realists' level of practice experience varied greatly,31 7 it is probably fair to
say that most of them, inspired by Oliver Wendell Holmes's pragmatic
and predictive "bad man" theory of the law, 31 8 manifested a practice-
oriented ethos to at least some extent.
In 1933, Jerome Frank, who had the most practice experience of the
leading realists, expressly championed the practitioner's perspective--or
at least what he thought should be the practitioner's perspective. In his ar-
ticle Why Not a Clinical Law School?, Frank asserted that law schools
should hire experienced attorneys as professors and should reform legal
education to "get in intimate contact with what clients need and with what
courts and lawyers actually do."31 9 He disparaged Langdell's case method
as the invention of a pathetic, isolated man with "an obsessive and almost
exclusive interest in books." 320  Many years earlier, Carter had similarly,
though more gently, criticized the Harvard case method's exclusive reli-
ance on law books, remarking that "[t]hese volumes [of reported
cases] ... are but a part of the great territory of fact which it is the busi-
ness of the lawyer and jurist to explore."32'
Just as Carter had scoffed at the "so-called rules found in our digests
1930s, have understated Realism's ethical concerns and political commitments. HORWITZ, supra note
7, at 169-92. Horwitz's argument depends mostly on expanding the list of"realists," however; he does
not really demonstrate (or even try to demonstrate) that the scholars traditionally identified as realists
prioritized questions of ethics and values.
316. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 145.
317. On one extreme was Walter Wheeler Cook, who did not practice at all before entering legal
academia. Cook was the first person in many years to be appointed to the Columbia Law faculty
without any practice experience. SCHLEGEL, supra note 271, at 28-35; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 37 (1973). At the other end of the spectrum was Jerome
Frank, who was a successful corporate lawyer in Chicago and New York for sixteen years before he
published his first book, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND. Despite the long association he had with Yale
Law School, Frank continued to practice throughout his life-on Wall Street, in the federal govern-
ment, and finally as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See generally
ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON
AMERICAN LAW 15-37 (1985). In the middle were realists such as Karl Llewellyn, who, before join-
ing academia, practiced for about two years in the legal department of a bank and in a major New
York City firm. TWINING, supra, at 101-02. Llewellyn's biographer surmises that his practice experi-
ence, however brief, affected his jurisprudence. Id. at 102.
318. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) ("If you
want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the mate-
rial consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict.").
319. Frank, supra note 220, at 913.
320. Id. at 908.
321. CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 44, at 339.
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and treatises and mentioned in the reports of decided cases," '322 Frank de-
rided the "so-called legal rules and principles" on which law professors
focused.323 In Frank's view.v, this excessive attention to rules and princi-
ples left students ill-prepared for practice.
Now no sane person will deny that a knowledge of those rules and
principles.., is part of the indispensable equipment of the future
lawyer. For such knowledge is of some limited aid in guessing what
courts will do.... But the tasks of the lawyer do not pivot around
those rules and principles. The work of the lawyer revolves about
specific decisions in definite pieces of litigation .... What the courts
will decide in specific cases involving the rights of specific clients
under specific acts, documents, or transactions must, therefore, be the
center of the lawyer's thinking. 
324
Frank, like Carter, considered conceptual formalism to be an impractical
fantasy of detached academicians.
As Frank himself recognized, there is no inevitable correlation between
litigation experience and a resistance to formal conceptualism.3 25 But the
language of both the post-Civil War anticodifers and the post-World War I
legal realists suggests that in examining the history of American legal
thought, it is useful to consider the possibility that the jurisprudence of
practicing lawyers (and of law professors with a practice background) has
been shaped by their practical experience.
D. Codification and Restatement
The parallels between Carter and the legal realists are perhaps most evi-
dent when one examines realist discussions of codification. With respect
to this subject, it is interesting to start with Oliver Wendell Holmes. The
very first scholarly article Holmes ever published was titled Codes, and
the Arrangement of the Law. It appeared in 1870 in the American Law
Review and was reprinted by the Harvard Law Review in 1931, during the
heyday of the legal realist movement.326 Despite the article's early date, it
is worthwhile to consider it in this context, because Holmes was such a
powerful influence on the realists of the 1920s and 1930s. 327
322. Id. at 233.
323. Frank, supra note 220, at 910.
324. /d.at910-ll.
325. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 60-61 (1970) (originally published 1930)
("[L]awyers are intensely practical men and their concern is with the lives and property of their clients.
Why, then,.., is generality so highly prized by lawyers at the expense of particularity?").
326. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 725
(1931) (previously published in 5 AM. L. REV. 1 (1870)). The Harvard Law Review reprinted this
article as part of a collection of four Early Writings ofO. W Holmes, Jr., with an introduction by Felix
Frankfurter. Frankfurter noted that the essays "pose juristic issues still, or, more accurately, again in
controversy." Id. at 720.
327. See Fisher, supra note 290, at 3 (discussing the realists' celebration of Holmes and frequent
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Holmes, a transitional figure, did not altogether reject the value of con-
ceptual ordering. Although he denied that general principles decided con-
crete cases, he acknowledged that such principles (in Thomas Grey's
words) "focused attention on the competing considerations relevant to the
decision, providing guidance by confining the range of argument. 3 28
Thus, in Codes, and the Arrangement of Law, Holmes remarked that a
"well-arranged" and "connected" statement of "the whole body of the
law" would be a valuable thing.
The importance of it, if it could be obtained, cannot be overrated. In
the first place it points out at once the leading analogy between
groups.... The perfect lawyer is he who commands all ties between
a given case and all others. But few lawyers are perfect, and all have
to learn their business. A well-arranged body of the law would not
only train the mind of the student to a sound legal habit of thought,
but would remove obstacles from his path which he now only over-
comes after years of experience and reflection.329
Because a single author might not have the capacity to prepare an entire
"philosophically arranged corpusjuris," Holmes suggested that the task be
assigned to a group of scholars working for the government.33 ° He op-
posed giving the work of these public employees the status of legislation,
however; he favored some sort of unenacted treatise rather than a true
code. Holmes justified this position as follows:
New cases will arise which will elude the most carefully constructed
formula. The common law, proceeding, as we have pointed out, by a
series of successive approximations-by a continual reconciliation of
cases-is prepared for this, and simply modifies the form of its rule.
But what will the court do with a code? If the code is truly law, the
court is confined to a verbal construction of the rule as expressed, and
must decide the case wrong. If the court, on the other hand, is at lib-
erty to... take into account that the code is only intended to declare
the judicial rule, and has done so defectively, and may then go on and
supply the defect ... . the code is not law, but a mere text-book rec-
ommended by the government as containing all at present known on
the subject.33
Holmes recognized that logic sometimes clashed with good sense when it
came to the resolution of specific matters, and he thought courts should
favor the latter on such occasions: "Law is not a science, but is essentially
empirical. Hence, although the general arrangement should be philoso-
citations to his works).
328. Grey, supra note 5, at 44.
329. Holmes, supra note 326, at 727.
330. Id. at 726-27.
331. Id. at 726.
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phical... compromises with practical convenience are highly proper."' 332
Holmes's position on codification was thus very like Carter's. Both
men, for the same reasons, opposed the enactment of a code with the force
of a statute, but both also recognized the merit of a well-arranged state-
ment of the common law. Carter similarly remarked that a
book containing a statement in the manner of a Digest, and in ana-
lytical and systematic form of the whole unwritten law, expressed in
accurate, scientific language, is indeed a thing which the legal profes-
sion has yearned after.... It would refresh the failing memory, re-
produce in the mind of its forgotten acquisitions, exhibit the body of
the law, so as to enable a view to be had of the whole, and of the rela-
tion of the several parts. 333
In the final analysis, however, Carter probably assigned less value to logi-
cally arranged principles than did Holmes-particularly the young
Holmes.
When the realists addressed the issue of codification decades later, there
was little, if any, call for the adoption of a complete code and the aban-
donment of the common law method. The once energetic codification
movement had splintered into an occasionally successful push for uniform
state laws in discrete areas, on the one hand, and the American Law Insti-
tute's scheme to produce an unenacted but authoritative Restatement of
the common law, on the other. Consequently, the realists had little to say
about the wisdom of true codification. Nevertheless, at least one major
realist directly critiqued the notion of a European-style code. In his influ-
ential book, Law and the Modern Mind, Jerome Frank attacked the prem-
ises of complete codification in a manner that highlights the similarities
between legal realism and Carter's jurisprudence.
In Frank's eyes, codification in its pure form was simply another variety
of the "legal fundamentalism" championed by the Langdellians.334 He
mocked those jurists who had contended throughout history, in his words:
"Let us end all this confusion by adopting a code. Let us once and for all
by statute enact a carefully prepared body of rules sufficiently complete to
settle all future controversies." '335 Frank observed that in each such in-
stance, from Frederick the Great's Prussia to Napoleon's France to mod-
em Germany, "the hope of attaining a large measure of legal certainty by
codification proved vain. It produced not certainty, but sterile logic-
chopping. ' 336 Frank continued:
Where code-worship has prevailed in code-governed countries, the
332. Id. at 728.
333. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 96-97.
334. FRANK, supra note 325, at 53 (Chapter VI titled "Beale, and Legal Fundamentalism").
335. Id. at 200.
336. Id. at 203.
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real judicial process of adaptation has been concealed under the guise
of formal exactness.... In attempts to achieve a perfect code cover-
ing all imaginable cases, we encounter again the old dream of legal
finality and exactitude. Once this dream took the form of a belief in a
list of rules directly God-derived. Belief in a man-made code, which
shall be exhaustive and final, is essentially the same dream in another
form, but a form which hides from superficial study the nature of the
dream. But a dream it is, nevertheless. For only a dream-code can
anticipate all possible legal disputes and regulate them in advance.33 7
Frank's psychoanalytical terminology and scornful attitude toward relig-
ion, qualities that pervaded his book, would have been foreign to Carter.
But Carter would have wholly agreed with Frank's assertion that codes are
invariably flawed because "no one can foresee all future combinations of
events.... Situations are bound to occur which the legislature never con-
templated when enacting the statutes. 338
Carter also would have concurred with Frank's contention that "the at-
tempt to have the courts apply statutes as if indeed they were all-
sufficient.., leads to no small measure of uncertainty."3 39 Carter main-
tained that judges, in their efforts to make statutes produce fair outcomes,
used "subtle arts of interpretation" that heightened uncertainty. 340 Frank
similarly explained:
Except in those cases which happen to be explicitly covered by the
code, the judicial interpreter takes out of the code provisions exactly
what he puts in. In spite of, or perhaps more accurately, because of,
this false appearance of purely logical interpretation, the decisions
become unpredictable. For where the code is silent, the conventional
theory of so-called "interpretation" requires the judge to decide cases
by analogy to some code rule, and the selection of the rule thus to be
applied by analogy involves, of course, the exercise of a flexible dis-
cretion to a far larger extent than is acknowledged by the exponents
of the theory or by the judges who believe that they are adhering to
the theory.34'
In stark contrast to Carter, Frank adamantly insisted that judges "made"
law. He did not mention Carter in Law and the Modern Mind, but he
surely would have dismissed Carter's customary theory as simply another
example of a "childish" belief in predetermined law.342 Nevertheless,
337. Id. at 203-04.
338. Id. at 204.
339. Id. at 205.
340. CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 43, at 37-38.
341. FRANK, supra note 325, at 205-06. Interestingly, Frank did not categorically reject all codi-
fication. In an appendix to his book, he remarked that "a code deliberately devised with reference to
the desirability of growth and stated in terms of general guiding and flexible principles may some day
prove to be the way out of some of the difficulties of legal administration in America." Id. at 337.
342. Id. at 204, 207. Frank praised John Dickinson's criticism of the "early 19th Century theory
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there is surprising overlap in the work of the two scholars; Carter antici-
pated by almost fifty years Frank's analysis of the consequences of apply-
ing general code provisions to particular cases.
By the legal realists' time, there was no serious effort to adopt a system
of complete codification in the United States. During the last years of the
nineteenth century, as it became clear that Field's campaign to codify the
entire common law would fail, scholars and practitioners interested in
codification had turned their attention to establishing uniform codes in
particular substantive areas for adoption by the states. This effort re-
mained very much alive in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, the legal realist
Karl Llewellyn became one of the leading figures in this second-wave
codification movement.
The American Bar Association (ABA) hatched the uniform code move-
ment in the early 1890s, as Field's campaign for his Civil Code, and Field
himself, were breathing their last.343 The National Conference of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), which the ABA
helped establish, met for the first time in 1892. By the 1930s, the com-
missioners had produced uniform acts in a variety of discrete commercial
subjects, some of which had been adopted by a majority of the states.344
In the late 1930s, Llewellyn started planning what would become the
uniform code movement's greatest triumph: the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). The NCCUSL and the American Law Institute jointly
drafted and revised the UCC during the 1940s and 1950s, and every state
but Louisiana eventually adopted it. Although many scholars and lawyers
worked on the UCC, Llewellyn, the chief reporter for the code, was indis-
putably the individual with the greatest influence over it. 345 The UCC re-
flected Llewellyn's realist ideals in various ways.
3 46
The fact that Llewellyn dedicated much of his career to preparing and
promoting a code does not, as one might suppose, reflect an important dis-
tinction between the realists and Carter. Llewellyn, like Jerome Frank,
unambiguously rejected the idea of a continental-style code providing for
every case within its scope.3 47 Indeed, in his 1931 encyclopedia article on
Carter, Llewellyn wholly sympathized with his subject's condemnation of
complete codification. He agreed that Field's Civil Code was "ill consid-
ered." Nevertheless, in the article, Llewellyn suggested that codification,
that the 'law behind the law' was located in popular custom." Id. at 283-84.
343. Field died in 1894.
344. For the history of the NCCUSL, see TWINING, supra note 317, at 272-73; James J. White, Ex
Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2097-2105 (1991).
345. See TWINING, supra note 317, at 270-340 (assessing the extent of Llewellyn's influence over
the UCC).
346. See id. at 302-40; Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975); Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl
Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARv. L. REV. 465 (1987).
347. TWINING, supra note 317, at 308.
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properly done, could be beneficial. He remarked, "[Carter's] argument at-
tacks not codification as it is-a fresh and fertile start for case law, which
at its best already incorporates existing tendencies-but the utopian ideal
of the blinder advocates of codification: a closed system, 'certain'-and
dead."348
Indeed, if the UCC had appeared during his lifetime, Carter might have
acknowledged that it was a noble effort, so far as any code could be noble.
As Richard Danzig argues with respect to Article II of the UCC, "[T]he
animating principle behind [Llewellyn's] theories and this legislative
achievement is, paradoxically, . . . a renunciation of legislative responsi-
bility and power." '349 Like Carter, Llewellyn preferred a flexible, contex-
tual, court-centered decisional process. He thus did not intend the UCC to
provide a resolution for every case in advance. Danzig observes:
Whereas a code functioned for such diverse thinkers as Frederick the
Great, Austin, or Williston as a means of dictating a result, Lle-
wellyn's UCC Article II more often operated as a means of dictating
a method. That method was designed to prompt decision not accord-
ing to the letter or the logic of a statute or a juristic concept but rather
according to the "situation-reason."35
Carter was a champion of the common law, and the UCC was, in the
words of one scholar, "drafted in the expectation that it would be inter-
preted by common law trained lawyers and judges.",35' The UCC explic-
itly incorporates the principles of common law and equity unless they are
"displaced" by particular code provisions.352 Moreover, it repeatedly di-
rects courts to consider what would be "reasonable" under the circum-
stances. 353 And Carter would certainly have approved of the fact that the
UCC makes "usage of trade" a presumed component of commercial
agreements.354 Ultimately, however, it is impossible to know how Carter
would have responded to an open-ended code like the UCC, for although
he might have admired certain features of the instrument, he likely would
have been hesitant to compromise his anticodification stance.
It is also unclear how Carter would have responded to the American
Law Institute's Restatement project. The ALI, founded in 1923, was (and
remains) an organization composed of law professors, judges, and practic-
ing lawyers dedicated to the "improvement of law."3 5 As noted above, it
348. Llewellyn, supra note 314, at 244.
349. Danzig, supra note 346, at 622.
350. Id. at 632.
351. TWINING, supra note 317, at 312.
352. U.C.C. § 1-103 (2004).
353. For a list of sections in Article II of the UCC that use "reasonable" or similar open-ended
terms, see Danzig, supra note 346, at 634.
354. See U.C.C. §1-205 (2004).
355. The American Law Institute, About the American Law Institute, http://www.ali.org/
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cooperated with the NCCUSL in the preparation of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. However, its primary mission, at the time of its formation, was
to prepare a comprehensive Restatement of the common law. By 1944,
the ALl had produced what it believed to be an authoritative Restatement
of the law in each of nine subject areas.356
Like David Dudley Field, the proponents of the Restatement project
hoped to alleviate the problems of legal uncertainty and complexity by set-
ting forth the fundamental principles of the common law in a logically or-
dered form. Despite the similar motives behind codification and the Re-
statements, however, Carter's opposition to the former does not
necessarily imply that he would have resisted the latter. Indeed, Carter
seemed to declare his support for something like a Restatement, remark-
ing, "A statement of the whole body of the law in scientific language, and
in a concise and systematic form. .. would be of priceless value." '357
In considering how Carter would have responded to the ALl Restate-
ment project, it is important to keep in mind a critical difference between
Field's Civil Code and the Restatements: the ALl never intended for the
latter to be enacted into law.358 Indeed, the institute rejected the statutory
path for reasons that closely paralleled Carter's anticodification argu-
ments. As Nathan Crystal has observed, the ALl worried that if the Re-
statements were enacted, "the flexibility of the common law would be
lost,.., courts would be bound simply to follow the statute and 'injustice
would result in many cases presenting unforeseen facts."' 35 9  Perhaps
Carter would have endorsed the Restatements so long as they remained
unenacted and thus avoided these problems.
Then again, Carter might have opposed the Restatements in the form
they actually assumed. His response might have been similar to that of the
realists, who initially viewed the ALI's project as a useful effort to ease
legal uncertainty, but whose "alienation ... was complete" by the time the
final versions were published. 360 Although the ALI did not pursue legisla-
tive enactment, it inherited the assumption of many code advocates that
ali/thisali.htm (last visited May 21, 2007).
356. Id.
357. CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 43, at 45.
358. Nathan M. Crystal, Codification and the Rise of the Restatement Movement, 54 WASH. L.
REV. 239, 244-45 (1979); G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modern-
ist Jurisprudence, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 12 (1997).
359. Crystal, supra note 358, at 245 (quoting ALl PROCEEDINGS, 1923, pt. I, at 24 (1923)).
360. Id. at 247. The early support of the Restatement project by at least some legal realists is ex-
emplified by realist Arthur Corbin's service as the principal assistant to the Chief Reporter of the Re-
statement of Contracts, classicist Samuel Williston. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT
59 (1974). In addition, in the early 1920s, realists Herman Oliphant and Karl Llewellyn expressed
cautious optimism about the Restatements. Crystal, supra note 358, at 245-46. Nathan Crystal pro-
poses that the realists' growing disaffection with the Restatements was more a result of their own in-
tellectual evolution than of any change in the nature of the Restatement project itself. Id. at 247-48.
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legal doctrines could be abstracted away from their factual contexts.3 61 As
G. Edward White has observed, the realists ultimately rejected the Re-
statement's embrace of taxonomic logic and the "coherence and relevance
of the legal rules themselves." '362 Realist Hessel E. Yntema remarked,
"[M]ost of the data to which attention should be given in a responsible
formulation of law have to be excluded in the preparation of the Restate-
ment-data as to the practical needs to be met and as to the appropriate-
ness of the means of regulation employed to meet them. '3 63  Criticizing
the Restatement's character as a "statement of the general principles of the
common law, not dissimilar to the European codes," Yntema observed, "It
is something of an irony that Carter's argument [that a good digest of the
law would be of 'priceless value'] is employed to support a Restatement of
the Law which has a purpose and many of the characters which he op-
posed." 364
X. CONCLUSION
The debates over codification described in this Article demonstrate that
jurisprudential strands identified almost exclusively with twentieth-
century legal realism were substantially present, if not necessarily domi-
nant, during the late nineteenth century. I thus challenge the long-
dominant mode of periodizing the history of American legal thought.
Karl Llewellyn's 1960 book The Common Law Tradition was premised
largely on the notion of "period style," which he defined as
the general and pervasive manner over the country at large, at any
given time, of going about the job, the general outlook, the ways of
professional knowhow, the kind of thing the men of law are sensitive
to and strive for, the tone and flavor of the working and of the re-
sults. 365
Llewellyn divided American legal history into a pre-Civil War "Grand
Style" and a post-Civil War "Formal Style," the latter epitomized by
Langdell.36 6 In an appendix to The Common Law Tradition, Llewellyn
felt compelled to mention that his "period style" idea had been germinat-
ing in his mind for almost thirty years.3 67 He remarked, "I do not want the
recent social science stirrings toward a 'style' concept to lead to any idea
361. See generally Crystal, supra note 358 (laying out the personal, institutional, and jurispruden-
tial continuities between the codification movement and the Restatement project).
362. White, supra note 358, at 34.
363. Hessel E. Yntema, What Should the American Law Institute Do?, 34 MICH. L. REv. 461, 468
(1936).
364. Id. at 469. Dean Charles E. Clark of Yale Law School, also a realist, similarly compared the
Restatement to a code. See KALMAN, supra note 271, at 27.
365. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 36 (1960).
366. Id. app. B at 35-39.
367. Id. at 519-20.
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that I am just joining what promises to become the next fad."' 3 68
Llewellyn's concern was justified; during the 1970s, the period-style
approach did become something of a fad in the field of American legal
history. In The Ages of American Law, Grant Gilmore identified an "Age
of Discovery," an "Age of Faith," and an "Age of Anxiety. ' 369 He argued
that Langdell epitomized the Age of Faith, observing: "A better symbol
[of the age] could hardly be found; if Langdell had not existed, we would
have had to invent him." 370
Gilmore's successors, likely inspired by the "paradigm-shifting" model
of intellectual history set forth in Thomas Kuhn's extraordinarily influen-
tial Structure of Scientific Revolutions,371 continued the tendency of divid-
ing American legal history into discrete eras. In The Transformation of
American Law, Morton Horwitz distinguished the "protective, regulative,
paternalistic and.., moral" law prior to the American Revolution from
the "flexible, instrumental conception of law" between 1776 and 1850,
and then demarcated the latter period from a subsequent reign of "legal
formalism. ' 372 In a seminal 1980 article, Duncan Kennedy, while making
allowance for the "spurious precision of dates," delineated three eras of
"legal consciousness": "Pre-Classical legal thought flourished between
1800 and 1860 and declined between 1860 and 1885. Classical legal
thought emerged between 1850 and 1885, flourished between 1885 and
1935, but was in rapid decline by 1940. Modem legal thought emerged
between 1900 and 1930 and survives to this day.,
3 73
In its sophisticated guises, the periodizing scholarship of the 1970s and
1980s did not cartoonishly portray legal history as a sequence of wholly
distinct homogeneous eras. Nonetheless, that generation's commitment to
the idea of deterministic structures of legal consciousness sometimes led it
to neglect the diversity and complexity of the jurisprudence of different
periods, particularly the late-nineteenth century. Indeed, when I was in
graduate school in the early 1990s, a prominent legal historian I knew
would not believe, until I showed him, that any leading jurist of the 1880s
368. Id. at 519.
369. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977) (an expanded version of Gilmore's
Yale Law School Storrs Lectures of 1974).
370. Id. at 42.
371. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). Peter Novick has
observed: "Kuhn's ideas were quickly taken up by scholars in fields far removed from the natural sci-
ences. It would be hard to nominate another twentieth-century American academic work which has
been as widely influential; among historical books it would appear to be without serious rival." PETER
NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PRO-
FESSION 526 (1988).
372. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 at 253-56
(1977).
373. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 23. See also Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice, supra
note 8, at 97 (identifying "three distinct versions of the ideology of legal science": the "antebellum
Whig-Federalist version," the "Liberal version," and the "Progressive version").
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could possibly have flatly declared that judges make, rather than find, the
common law. (The example I provided him, interestingly, was David
Dudley Field, speaking in favor of codification.3 74)
As Stephen Siegel observes, there is now a growing body of literature
that attempts to supply a "more textured and multifaceted" portrait of
Gilded Age legal thought.3 75 Siegel remarks: "At the least, the current re-
visionism is rendering a simple portrait more complex. It is replacing an
overarching theoretical structure, which is the type of historiography that
modem historians tend to spurn, with their much beloved 'thick descrip-
tion."' 37 6 Similarly, a 2006 article by Christopher Waldrep reviews how
recent studies of Gilded Age legal thought have focused on "particular
people" and "particular places" to "question an earlier generation's his-
torical generalizations" and challenge "paradigmatic assertions" about
American jurisprudence. 377
I have attempted to further this paradigm-shattering mission in this Arti-
cle. I do not claim that James Coolidge Carter was himself the paradig-
matic legal thinker of the Gilded Age. I do, however, reject the notion that
Langdell's brand of amoral legal science typified the period, and I also
question the complete hegemony of "classicism" broadly defined. More
generally, I intend my examination of the anticlassicism of the Gilded Age
anticodifiers, and their commonalities with the realists, to promote a
healthy wariness of sweeping characterizations of any era in American le-
gal history.
374. See, e.g., FIELD, CODIFICATION: AN ADDRESS, supra note 55, at 15 (rejecting code oppo-
nents' claim "that the judges do not make but only declare the common law. Who made this common
law, if the judges did not?").
375. Siegel, The Revision Thickens, supra note 233, at 635 (2002).
376. Id. at 637 (discussing Manuel Cachfn, Justice Stephen Field and "Free Soil, Free Labor
Constitutionalism ": Reconsidering Revionism, 20 LAW & HIST. REv. 541 (2002) and Grossman,
Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra note 3).
377. Christopher Waldrep, Law and Society: Structuring Legal Revolutions, 1870-1920, 5 J. OF
GILDED AGE AND PROGRESSIVE ERA 309, 310, 313 (2006) (discussing, as examples of studies of "par-
ticular people," LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN
(1999) and Grossman, Mugwump Jurisprudence, supra note 3).
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